Oakland – (Special to OaklandNewsOnline.com) – This text is directly from a publication called “A Multi-Agency Review of The October 1991 Fire In The Oakland-Berkeley Hills” and this blogger, Zennie Abraham, happened to find online in what is called a giant “Internet archive”. The document was prepared for then-Oakland Mayor Elihu Harris and Berkeley Mayor Lonnie Hancock.
How The 1991 Oakland Hills Fire Started And What Happened?
Frrom the report you’re about to read, here’s a multi-paragraph summary of The 1991 Oakland Hills Fire:
The fire began at or near the location of a three-acre fire on the previous day. Because there was no wind on Saturday, the 19th, the small fire was controlled with relative ease. Firefighters doused the burn area with water before they left late in the evening of the 19th.
By 8:30 a.m. the next morning, Oakland Fire Department personnel were on the scene continuing mop-up of the Saturday fire. They were dealing with a few flare-ups-- successfully--when, at about 10:45 a.m., a spark from within the burn area was blown by gusting northeast winds to a fuel-rich spot just out of the burn area. The same winds worked like a bellows on the spark and the fire was out of control in a few minutes.
The East Bay hills blaze was a classic canyon-influenced fire. The high tops of Claremont, Grizzly, and Swainland (Horse) ridges and Upper Rockridge hill form a horseshoe-shaped bowl. After ignition, the fire ran up toward Grizzly Peak Boulevard, as canyon fires tend to do. The strong northeast wind simultaneously blew it down toward Buckingham Boulevard. The thermal column from the fire quickly reached a thermal inversion layer at around 3,500 feet. This layer effectively put a lid on the bowl and trapped the heat; this preheated all the fuels within the bowl and made ignition more likely.
As the fire swept downslope, driven by the fierce wind, it gained momentum from the continuous cover of coyote brush and trees. The fire moved directly from tree cover to houses along the lower canyon slope. Within 15 minutes of the first house ignition, the fire had gained such intensity that it developed into at least one, and probably two, firestorms.
It then swirled up, around, and through Hiller Highlands. An airborne observer described the thermal column as looking and behaving like a tornado.
Airborne flaming material spread the fire across Highway 24, an eight-lane freeway. Both brush and combustible roof coverings on the south side of Highway 24 were ignited. The airborne observer reported 50 or more roofs in Upper Rockridge igniting one after the other, much like lights coming on in rooms as someone races down the hallway flipping on the switches.
The October 20th fire ignited 790 structures in its first hour. In the ten hours that it roared through Oakland and Berkeley’s prime hill areas, it torched homes at the rate of one each 11 seconds. It defied every attempt to stop its progress until thousands of firefighters (resident, volunteer, and professional) assembled hundreds of pieces of fire apparatus, and the wind subsided.
That evening the wind subsided and, in some places, changed directions to blow back over the burned area. The fire spread was halted on all fronts, except for a few spot fires along the perimeter, by 9:00 p.m. Sunday evening. Firefighters drew a perimeter around the fire by the pre-dawn hours of Monday, October 21. The fire was declared "contained" on
Tuesday afternoon and "under control" on Wednesday morning.
The East Bay Hills Fire
A Multi-Agency Review of the October 1991
Fire in the Oakland/Berkeley Hills
IN Lit e} Ke, RNA
East Bay Hills Fire Operations Review Group
State of California
Governor's Office of Emergency Services
Pete Wilson
Governor
Richard Andrews, Ph.D.
Director, Office of Emergency Services
STATE OF CALIFORNIA HETE ILS OS Sisco
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OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
2800 MEADOW VIEW ROAD (CUA ML MIAR EO RaNnCA
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95832 *
(916) 4274990 ‘
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California Office of
Emergency Services
To Readers of this Report:
The calamity in the hills of Oakland and Berkeley on Sunday, October 20, 1991, was
California’s most devastating fire since the conflagration that ravaged San Francisco in 1906.
In preparing this report, careful attention has been paid to issues raised by residents
and the media regarding circumstances surrounding the fire.
We believe this report is a definitive account of public agency emergency operations
related to the East Bay hills fire. It may not, however, answer every question.
Our focus is toward the future, toward lessons that should be learned by all fire
agencies, emergency services personnel, elected officials, and the public.
Two fundamental points need to be made:
cm iL In the absence of aggressive fire mitigation efforts, public safety officials may
again face circumstances as overwhelming as those encountered on October 20.
An earlier report published by the Office of Emergency Services and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency -- Hazard Mitigation Report for the East Bay Fire
in the Oakland - Berkeley Hills -- details mitigation measures to reduce fire risk in
California’s most vulnerable communities.
2; When truly catastrophic events happen, standard methods for managing large-
scale emergencies may prove inadequate.
Public safety agencies at all levels -- fire, police, emergency services,
emergency medical -- should develop protocols for quick identification of potentially
catastrophic situations, and institutionalize procedures for rapid assignment of resources and
personnel based upon meaningful damage assessments.
The Office of Emergency Services will accelerate work with agencies throughout
California to enhance our ability to respond to potentially catastrophic events.
Richard Andrews, Ph.D.
>» Director
THE EAST BAY HILLS FIRE
Report to:
Elihu Harris,
Mayor of Oakland
&
Loni Hancock,
Mayor of Berkeley
ty
from the CRIVERSITY oe
East Bay Hills Fire
Operations Review Group
of the
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
February 27, 1992
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024 with funding trom
state of California and California State Library
https ://archive.org/details/C 124903647
COMMENDATIONS
Members of the community and public safety personnel responded with inspiring
dedication and heroism on October 20, 1991.
The exceptional performances of these individuals -- too numerous to be each
mentioned -- prevented a much larger loss of life and property.
The efforts of residents and public safety officials were undertaken under extremely
difficult, often life-threatening circumstances. People did the best they could, working long
hours in an environment that included searing heat and flames, blinding smoke and
sometimes erratic, hazardous fire behavior.
The fire-fighting abilities of individual engine companies, from Oakland and
Berkeley, other responding jurisdictions, the California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection and East Bay Regional Parks District, attests to their collective experience and
dedication.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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PREFACE
On October 25, 1991, in a letter to Governor Pete Wilson, Oakland Mayor Elihu
Harris asked the state to conduct a review of the operational effectiveness of fire, police and
emergency management response to the East Bay hills fire. The review concentrates on
four aspects of response: policies, procedures, equipment and training. The Mayors of
Oakland and Berkeley constituted separate task forces to receive and consider input from
citizens and community-based groups on the fire response.
The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) was assigned the responsibility
for the conduct of this review. OES is a state agency, reporting directly to the Governor,
responsible for coordination of emergency planning, response and recovery. OES is not a
regulatory agency. It plays a key role in coordinating training and mutual aid response
related to all emergencies.
OES empaneled a review group composed of individuals with broad experience in
the fire service, law enforcement and emergency services disciplines. The group began work
on November 8, 1991.
Initially the group reviewed all printed accounts related to this incident. This
material yielded a list of potential issues: concerns voiced by citizens; potential
discrepancies in inter-agency coordination; and difficulties in managing an emergency of this
size and scope. Eventually, an outline was developed from this long list. Outline headings
are reflected as sections in this report.
The work was divided among group members. They reviewed logs and records,
conducted interviews, and received briefings on equipment and systems in place at the time
of the fire. Over 75 individuals involved in response were interviewed. Simultaneously, a
written survey was disseminated to fire agencies that sent resources to the fire, including the
cities originally with jurisdiction over it. Over 400 survey responses were eventually
received. With information gathered in this manner, and from the experience of group
members, this report chronicles what happened and formulates realistic recommendations.
The report is organized in a manner consistent with the time-sequence involved in
response to this emergency. However, this is not chronological in every case. It begins with
a discussion of the preparations and conditions present in each department prior to the fire.
Since fire response begins with a call to some communications center, these sites, and
communications capability in general, are considered next.
Alarm is considered next. The Saturday fire, and the adequacy of mop-up related
to it, is discussed in the mop-up segment of this report which appears later.
sive
Strategy and tactics are considered next, with discussion of actual decision making
and coordination. The Mutual Aid System and the Incident Command System are then
discussed with emphasis on the relationship between these systems and their components.
Evacuations, a critical action in major fires, receives specific consideration. This is
followed by discussion of the use of volunteers, the mop-up process, and demobilization.
The final issues considered are those related to public information, law enforcement,
and emergency management.
In each case, the information records significant activities, processes or issues which
led the group to suggest specific recommendations. In some cases, a general theme emerged
that necessitated a recommendation.
This report is prepared in the spirit of improving the fire service and public safety
within not only Oakland and Berkeley, but throughout California. The goal of the review
is to enhance response to future emergencies.
Michael Guerin
Review Group Chair
6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report could not have been produced without the cooperation of the fire
departments of the affected communities, the East Bay Regional Park District, and
Lawrence Livermore Lab. The generous help offered by individual members of those
departments was invaluable in forming a comprehensive understanding of what went on
during the October 20th fire.
The detail and depth provided by all the departments that responded to the review
group’s questionnaire is also greatly appreciated.
The task of assembling and sifting all the findings fell to the members of the East
Bay Hills Fire Operations Review Group. Together members of the group have over 500
years of experience in firefighting and fire management, including both wildland and urban
expertise.
REVIEW GROUP
* Michael Brady, Chief of the Hazardous Materials Section for OES’s California
Specialized Training Institute.
x Tom de Bakker, Deputy State Fire Marshal for the California State Fire Marshal’s
Office.
2 Denise Knight, Deputy State Fire Marshal for the California State Fire Marshal’s
Office.
= Dan Matson, Deputy Chief with the California Department of Forestry and Fire
Protection.
| William Maxfield, Fire Chief of the Contra Costa County Fire Protection District.
= Gerald Newcombe, Vice-Chair of the State Board of Fire Services.
“ Loren Poore, Chair of the Interagency Wildland Fire Prevention Committee and the
Wildland Arson Response Group.
DEPARTMENT LIAISON REPRESENTATIVES
6 Paul Burastero, Assistant Fire Chief in the Berkeley Fire Department.
w Richard L. Jones, Administrative Captain with the Piedmont Fire Department.
= Alford Nero, Captain for Administration with the Oakland Fire Department.
| Andrew M. Stark, Assistant Fire Chief for Operations with the Oakland Fire
Department.
LAW ENFORCEMENT REPRESENTATIVE
a Laurence Buffaloe, Chief of the OES Law Enforcement Division.
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT REPRESENTATIVE
a Vincent Montane, Regional Manager for state OES Region II.
REVIEW GROUP COORDINATOR
a Richard Aronson, Chief of the OES Fire and Rescue Division.
PRINCIPAL STAFF
| Richard Millar, U.S. Forest Service Retired.
e Bill Tonguet, OES Fire and Rescue Division Retired.
REVIEW GROUP CHAIR
a Michael Guerin, OES Assistant Director responsible for Response and Recovery.
We are grateful to all who helped the group gather, review, and interpret data.
Karen Coombs, Frank Potter and Bruce Gadbois of CSTI contributed to the survey design
and analysis.
We would especially like to acknowledge the following: Laura Ghilardi, word
processing; Sarah Nathe, editing; and Sue Dubie-Holbrook, printing/assembly of this
document.
- Vii -
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
A. SCOPE OF REPORT
This report is intended as a review of the operations of all agencies that responded
to the October 20, 1991, fire in the East Bay hills. In keeping with the request that
occasioned it, the report concentrates primarily on training, procedures, equipment, and
policies.
The report is organized in sections that address operations in each arena of fire
fighting, from training and preparedness to mop-up and demobilization. Although the focus
is on fire organizations, public information, law enforcement, and emergency management
operations are also reviewed.
The material presented here was gathered as thoroughly as possible. It does not
depict each front of the fire at every moment. Nor does it adequately represent how much
was going on simultaneously as the fire raged.
The order imposed on the material is intended to allow for evaluation of major
issues, and statement of significant recommendations. It is roughly chronological, from the
beginning of the fire to demobilization some days later.
To make the recommendations most obvious, they are listed below in summary form,
and in the order in which they appear in the report.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Preparedness
& Improve public safety agencies’ understanding of the national fire danger
rating system. Components related to ignition, spotting potential, expected
rates of spread, and fire behavior are pertinent to wildland intermix fires.
a Develop local emergency action plans that deal effectively with "red flag"
program. Urban fire departments with hillside /wildland intermix areas should
train staff in the application of the national fire danger rating system.
a Revise local hillside/intermix fire plans in light of the experience of October
19-20, 1991. Fire hazard mitigation measures are essential.
8 Coordinate plans and mitigation measures with other jurisdictions and
government levels. See the joint federal, state, local Hazard Mitigation Report
for the East Bay Fire, issued by FEMA and OES, for greater detail.
Bie
Make wildland fire control a component of scheduled training.
2. Communications
Assign a supervising fire dispatcher to be present in dispatch centers at all
times. A working knowledge of fire terminology and mutual aid procedures
is important to handle complex or large emergencies.
Separate fire and police dispatch functions whenever possible. This assures
that the fire dispatcher is knowledgeable and paying undivided attention.
Train fire dispatchers in terminology, mobilization of fire and support service
apparatus, and air operation deployment. An ability to keep track of
resources and their locations is also necessary.
Train dispatchers in initiating mutual aid requests and recognizing the "intent"
of mutual aid requests.
Plan to allocate radio frequencies by function, operational division, and
support service. Monitor each frequency at the command center.
Set up dedicated "outgoing only" telephone lines in dispatch centers. Do not
list or post the outgoing line numbers.
Conduct frequent interagency radio communication exercises. All fire
departments in an area should participate.
3. Strategy and Tactics
Expand operational level command staff to meet recognized standards for
span of control in fire fighting. One chief officer for each five to eight
operational companies is optimal.
Appoint a deputy chief to enhance interplatoon coordination and insure unity
of command concepts.
Recognize the limitations of air tankers and water-dropping helicopters.
Agencies with those resources should provide all urban fire departments with
guidelines for safe & effective air operations.
Develop a more expedient means of adapting hydrant outlets from 3" to 2-
1/2" National Standard Thread. Investigate the feasibility of installing
adapters with break-away caps.
Upgrade the water grid sufficiently to produce a fire flow consistent with
building density and size.
ca
Install a permanent auxiliary pumping system for refilling all upper water
zones in hill areas.
Maintain a list of locally available water tenders at all fire dispatch centers.
4. Mutual Aid System
Prepare all fire service agencies for "worst case" scenarios, particularly fires,
earthquakes, hazardous material and mass casualty incidents.
Increase the response speed and capability of California’s mutual aid systems.
Improve inter-regional alerting protocols.
Hold more frequent mutual aid mobilization exercises. Design them to be
real-time.
Include a designated strike team leader in all prearranged strike team
consignments.
Begin moving requested resources immediately.
All fire departments should plan for receiving mutual aid from many
participants. Include in plans reporting, staging, deployment, supporting and
demobilization protocols.
Make exercises for wildland/structural fires part of the regular training
schedule. Interagency, multiple company exercises should be held yearly.
Establish automatic mutual aid, boundary drops, and interagency response for
mutual threat zones, including multi-disciplinary incidents.
Familiarize all personnel with protocols, procedures and terminology for
requesting air support.
5. Incident Command System
Provide training to all local emergency response personnel in the ICS system.
Personnel outside emergency services should also be trained in the areas of
logistics and finance.
Schedule increased interdepartmental drills in ICS.
Reduce incompatibility in communications systems at all levels, and between
local and state agencies.
Include in ICS training and drills opportunities to learn and practice the
transition from single resource to multi-agency incident. Both command and
support staff benefit from working on this complex set of procedures.
Design exercises to allow all officers to gain experience in all operational
roles.
Include a communications function in the ICS structure.
Plan for early information/intelligence gathering and procedures for sharing
with Emergency Operations Center and media.
6. Evacuations
Clarify in each jurisdiction which agencies have statutory authority to order
and supervise evacuation.
Equip all fire vehicles with loudspeakers so that firefighters can inform
citizens of need for evacuation.
Schedule information exchanges among all operational level fire and police
personnel from all jurisdictions in a mutual threat zone. Discuss local
procedures, authority, and automatic mutual aid agreements.
Use the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) and Emergency Digital
Information System (EDIS) to its fullest benefit.
Conduct public information campaigns throughout California on evacuation
issues.
7. Volunteers
8. Mop-up
Plan and prepare to deal with and use spontaneous volunteers and resources
early in an incident.
Create an organizational element in fire departments to manage and use
voluntary resources.
Develop a policy in every emergency organization to promote and use
volunteers.
Make wildland fire mop-up techniques a component of scheduled training.
~% 9. Demobilization
a An independent committee of the Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid System is
studying this issue and will make recommendations at a later date.
10. Emergency Public Information
a Dispatch a trained Public Information Officer (PIO) immediately to any major
incident. Give public information provision a high priority.
i Include a team of PIO’s in the emergency response plan for every city and
county.
= Equip the PIO team with a mobile and EOC information center, complete
with staff, phones, and fax machines.
a Plan to provide media reporters with access to information, whether by phone
or by entrance to the disaster area.
= Train law enforcement personnel from all cities in recognizing the access
rights of media representatives.
Ss
11. Emergency Management
= Enhance multi-discipline coordination, particularly between fire, law, and
emergency services agencies at all levels.
= OES should develop formal mutual aid procedures for emergency services
personnel.
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THE FIRE
The October 20, 1991 fire started in the Oakland hills north of the Caldecott Tunnel,
near Buckingham Boulevard. This is a residential area of Oakland, with houses built rather
densely, some on steep hill slopes, and many surrounded by abundant shrubbery and trees.
In this area there have been other major fires: most notably, one in September of 1970 that
burned more than 200 acres in roughly the same neighborhood and destroyed 37 homes; and
the infamous September, 1923 fire which burned through the Berkeley hills and down into
the city, destroying over 600 homes in an hour.
The structures in the hills are mostly wood frame; their siding is wood panel, wood
shake, or stucco; and their roofing is wood shake, ceramic tile, asphalt shingle, or other
forms involving rock and asphalt.
The fire began at or near the location of a three-acre fire on the previous day.
Because there was no wind on Saturday, the 19th, the small fire was controlled with relative
ease. Firefighters doused the burn area with water before they left late in the evening of
the 19th.
By 8:30 a.m. the next morning, Oakland Fire Department personnel were on the
scene continuing mop-up of the Saturday fire. They were dealing with a few flare-ups--
successfully--when, at about 10:45 a.m., a spark from within the burn area was blown by
gusting northeast winds to a fuel-rich spot just out of the burn area. The same winds
worked like a bellows on the spark and the fire was out of control in a few minutes.
The East Bay hills blaze was a classic canyon-influenced fire. The high tops of
Claremont, Grizzly, and Swainland (Horse) ridges and Upper Rockridge hill form a
horseshoe-shaped bowl. After ignition, the fire ran up toward Grizzly Peak Boulevard, as
canyon fires tend to do. The strong northeast wind simultaneously blew it down toward
Buckingham Boulevard. The thermal column from the fire quickly reached a thermal
inversion layer at around 3,500 feet. This layer effectively put a lid on the bowl and trapped
the heat; this preheated all the fuels within the bowl and made ignition more likely.
As the fire swept downslope, driven by the fierce wind, it gained momentum from
the continuous cover of coyote brush and trees. The fire moved directly from tree cover to
houses along the lower canyon slope. Within 15 minutes of the first house ignition, the fire
had gained such intensity that it developed into at least one, and probably two, firestorms.
It then swirled up, around, and through Hiller Highlands. An airborne observer described
the thermal column as looking and behaving like a tornado.
Airborne flaming material spread the fire across Highway 24, an eight-lane freeway.
Both brush and combustible roof coverings on the south side of Highway 24 were ignited.
The airborne observer reported 50 or more roofs in Upper Rockridge igniting one after the
other, much like lights coming on in rooms as someone races down the hallway flipping on
the switches.
The October 20th fire ignited 790 structures in its first hour. In the ten hours that
it roared through Oakland and Berkeley’s prime hill areas, it torched homes at the rate of
one each 11 seconds. It defied every attempt to stop its progress until thousands of
firefighters (resident, volunteer, and professional) assembled hundreds of pieces of fire
apparatus, and the wind subsided.
That evening the wind subsided and, in some places, changed directions to blow back
over the burned area. The fire spread was halted on all fronts, except for a few spot fires
along the perimeter, by 9:00 p.m. Sunday evening. Firefighters drew a perimeter around the
fire by the pre-dawn hours of Monday, October 21. The fire was declared "contained" on
Tuesday afternoon and "under control" on Wednesday morning.
The fire killed 25 people, injured 150, and burned over 1600 acres. It destroyed 3354
single family residences, 456 apartments, and did an estimated $1.5 billion in damages.
As home building continues to spread into the very desirable locations in California’s
foothills, fires like the East Bay hills fire will become more common. But the
urban/wildland interface, or intermix, fire involving homes built near or in brush areas is
vastly different from the fires urban firefighters encounter on a daily basis. It also differs
from wildland fires in many respects because it involves the very generous fuel supply
provided by wood structures.
A fire burning 400 or more homes per hour does not allow for normal fire-fighting
tactics -- either urban or wildland. Few if any fire departments have the resources necessary
to control such a fire quickly. They must rely on mutual aid. Although California has an
excellent master mutual aid plan, it can not respond fast enough in most cases to prevent
an intermix fire from destroying many homes.
The East Bay Hills fire is similar in many respects to the Paint fire in Santa Barbara
County in July of 1990, and the College hills fire in Glendale in June, 1990. None of the
fires is considered large in terms of wildland fires, but each one presented unique challenges
to firefighters: water pressure was inadequate; narrow streets quickly became blocked and
impeded both ingress and egress; numerous untreated wood roofs contributed to fire spread;
most houses were without proper bush clearance; and the fire advanced along multiple
fronts.
Complicating the fight against each fire were additional problems: resources were
immediately overtaxed; communications were inadequate; extensive evacuations were
necessary; the struggle to save houses and groups of houses had to be abandoned in order
to consolidate resources or control fire spread; incoming mutual aid units were unfamiliar
with the area; and coordination was needed among law enforcement, fire, and other
agencies.
The natural forces at work on October 20, 1991 were extreme, but not exceptional
for the season, the place, and the ecosystem. The high temperature (92°F) set a record --
by one degree. The relative humidity was very low (16%), as it frequently is in October.
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The temperature inversion at about 3500 feet, high winds from the northeast (averaging 20
mph, gusting to 35-50), and dry conditions from a long-term drought were all fairly typical
for an autumn day. The only atypical phenomenon was the especially abundant fuel supply
provided by a freeze the previous December that killed plants and trees. But the freeze
only increased available fuel; it didn’t create it.
The conditions were conducive to the conflagration that resulted, but they were not
exceptional. They occur in hilly, urban/wildland intermix areas all over the state every
autumn. We can do little to control them, but we must be ready for them. We can control
construction and subdivision standards. We can adopt and enforce prudent brush, limb, and
debris clearance standards. We can widen roads and provide alternate safe routes of access
and egress. Or we can continue to pay for our failure to do so through higher fire insurance
premiums, taxes, utility bills, and -- from time to time -- death and destruction.
The choice is ours: elected and career public officials, neighborhood groups, and
citizens each have a role and a responsibility. The choice is not exclusive to Oakland and
Berkeley -- a tour through any of California’s hill communities reveals a potential for other
tragic urban/wildland intermix conflagrations. How well we heed the lessons from this
disastrous fire will determine the safety of future development in California.
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l. PREPAREDNESS
A. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
California’s fire service has adopted the Incident Command System (ICS) for all
emergency management needs. The system provides for the orderly expansion of emergency
management from a single operational unit to a large multifaceted, interdisciplinary and
interagency emergency group. Training for implementation of ICS varies greatly on a
department-by-department basis throughout the state.
Both Berkeley and Oakland utilize ICS. Berkeley has been utilizing the system for
several years. Oakland started implementation and training following the 1989 earthquake.
All of Berkeley’s Senior Chief Officers have completed the National Fire Academy’s
"Command and Control" course, which includes ICS. Most of Berkeley’s operational level
officers have completed the ICS Strike Team Leader course.
Oakland’s Training Division provides orientation training for company level officers.
Oakland routinely utilizes ICS during multiple-company drills to give chief officers
experience in performing the various functional specialties of the system. Oakland’s
operational level chief officers are all qualified strike team leaders.
Both departments utilize ICS for all emergencies and it is therefore incorporated into
training exercises wherever command and control elements are present.
B. WILDLAND TRAINING
Berkeley’s training division schedules and monitors company level training. Wildland
training is included in the daily training schedule throughout the year. Berkeley participated
in interagency wildland exercises with the East Bay Regional Parks in the spring of 1991.
Some of Berkeley’s company and operational level chief officers participated in a wildland
fire mutual aid exercise with Santa Clara County in 1990.
Oakland’s training division schedules and monitors company level training. Wildland
fire topics are routinely included as a study assignment. Drills (exercises) are scheduled on
an as-needed-basis. There had been no recruit classes during 1991 and no wildland
exercises were scheduled.
C. MUTUAL AID
Berkeley routinely includes mutual aid training in the schedule for company officers.
Oakland’s training schedule does not routinely include mutual aid procedures. Personnel
often gain practical experience because of their frequent involvement in mutual aid
responses.
Ot
D. PLANS
Berkeley has a written plan which outlines procedures/actions for hill fire
emergencies ("Panoramic Hill Fire Response and Hill Fire Problem").
Oakland has a formally adopted "Hills Plan" which defines operational policies and
guidelines for hill fire contingencies. The plan was used on October 20, 1991.
Each of the departments is currently revising its respective hill fire plan.
The "red flag" program is part of the US Weather Bureau fire weather forecast.
These fire weather forecasts are used by the National Fire Danger Rating System to
generate forecast manning/dispatch indices and weather. In order to use this program, cities
need to understand the system and have an action plan for "red flag" watch/warning periods.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
# There should be a better understanding of the National Fire Danger Rating
System. This includes the components related to ignition, spotting potential and expected
rates of spread and fire behavior. This includes the need for local emergency action plans
that deal effectively with "red flag" programs. Local agencies should make arrangements
with the Office of Emergency Services and Department of Forestry and Fire Protection to
receive these warnings on a timely basis.
a Urban fire departments, particularly those with wildland intermix fire
problems, should have some persons within their departments trained to understand the use
and application of the National Fire Danger Rating System.
= Local hillside/intermix fire plans for hazardous fire areas should be revised
in light of the information discerned through this fire review. Again, mitigation measures
are essential. Response patterns should change as a result of the lessons of this fire.
Automatic aid integrated first alarm response zones should be developed and adopted
without regard for boundaries.
cs This review specifically targeted preparation and operations related to the
emergency response to this disaster. There are hazard mitigation issues that cannot be fully
separated from this topic. Clearly, topics such as roofing, zones and codes, planning, and
others have a direct bearing on fire behavior, and rate of spread. While these issues are
mentioned in this report, see the joint federal, state, and local Hazard Mitigation Report for
the East Bay Fire, issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for greater detail
and recommendations.
a Institute staffing pattern changes to strengthen companies in hazardous fire
areas during "red flag" programs.
10:
| Wildland fire control should become a component of scheduled in-service
company training. Training should include all aspects of wildland tactics, i.e., SUppression,
firebreak construction, cold trailing, hot spotting, safety, and survival techniques.
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ll. COMMUNICATIONS
The dispatch function and communications between the dispatchers and incident
commander were two critical parts of the response. It is appropriate to consider the
dispatching in the context of the real working conditions there, rather than in comparison
to an ideal environment.
A. DISPATCH
1. Oakland
Normal staffing at Oakland Fire Dispatch is one dispatch supervisor and two
dispatchers on day and graveyard shifts and one supervisor and three dispatchers on swing
shifts. On October 20, one dispatch supervisor was present; one veteran dispatcher and one
with six months experience were on duty. Oakland has the ability to expand to a maximum
of six staffed consoles, each with the same capabilities. Fire Dispatch operated on a new
Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system that had been installed in June. However, this
was a replacement for an earlier CAD system and the change did not seem to be a factor.
Basic training for dispatchers is handled in-house, with the majority learning through
on-the-job training. There is little formal training on topics such as mutual aid since a Fire
Officer is typically called in to the Dispatch Center to handle such matters when needed.
Also, Oakland has historically regarded itself as the "big" agency in the East Bay which
typically provides mutual aid. Dispatchers rarely handle mutual aid callouts and may not
be trained in procedures.
In this case, it appears that adequate personnel responded to dispatch to assist the
regular staff; Oakland fire personnel, off-duty dispatchers, and even an ex-employee
responded to Dispatch and assisted with the effort there. Problems which developed were
generally more related to system capabilities than to personnel.
The volume of traffic generated by the public and by responding elements overloaded
all communications systems. No telephone lines are reserved for outgoing calls only. As
the available phone lines became flooded with calls coming in, dispatch personnel were
unable to access outside lines to make needed calls in a timely manner. Similarly, radio
traffic quickly overloaded available frequencies.
It was reported that fire command in the field had considerable difficulty contacting
Dispatch at times, often making repeated calls from cellular telephones until finally a line
cleared and they could communicate on immediate issues. This delay caused the
information flow to be piecemeal. It was difficult to maintain an accurate picture of
resources committed or available, and to monitor the progress of the fire itself in all areas.
{oe
As one result of the overcrowding of radio channels, field elements turned to self-
assigning their units to activities based on their best judgment. They were not part of a
centrally directed response. Others turned to alternate means of communicating: using
non-fire frequencies or, in at least one case, speaking to an Oakland police officer who
relayed information through his Dispatch center to the Fire Dispatch Center. At least one
agency, which had Oakland’s fire frequencies programmed into their radios, was unable to
contact Oakland Fire on those frequencies.
Units from outside jurisdictions were called in through the established Mutual Aid
System and by direct requests outside of that system. Others responded of their own
volition and assisted in fire-fighting efforts.
2. Berkeley
The City of Berkeley began utilizing civilian dispatchers in the Fire Dispatch Center
in 1976. The separate Police and Fire Dispatch centers were combined in 1984 into a joint
Public Safety Communications Center. There is one dedicated position for fire dispatching
and one for police dispatching. These dispatch positions are supported by at least two
additional call takers and a Dispatch Supervisor. Each position is capable of answering
telephones, however, radio traffic is handled by the dedicated Police or Fire position.
Five days a week, from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., there is a Fire Captain working in the
Communications Center to assist in supervising the fire operations. There is also a Senior
Public Safety Dispatcher (SPSD) position that has direct supervision responsibility. On the
morning of October 20, 1991, there was no supervisor on duty. The staffing that morning
included three Public Safety Dispatchers (PSD), and one Police Service Assistant (PSA).
The PSA is not trained to operate radio equipment.
The Berkeley Dispatch log clearly indicates the person answering calls was not
familiar with fire terminology. The log indicates that the Communications Center was aware
of Oakland’s Saturday fire, but not where it was located, although Berkeley sent two engine
companies and a chief officer into Oakland to assist on the fire. The Communications
Center was aware that Oakland Fire Department was working the same fire on Sunday
morning.
As the morning of October 20th progressed, people in Berkeley and Oakland, in the
vicinity of the fire, started calling Berkeley reporting the fire. It was a warm windy day, and
citizens were becoming concerned as the volume of smoke in the area of the fire increased.
The Berkeley Dispatcher told callers the fire was in Oakland, and not a problem. As the
smoke column expanded, so did the calls. There was no contact made by Berkeley
Communications Center or Berkeley Fire Department to question Oakland on the fire
conditions. The on duty Berkeley Assistant Chief, after watching the smoke conditions for
30 minutes, decided to take a look, and proceeded into Oakland.
The calls to the Berkeley Communications Center intensified to a nearly
unmanageable point. People were calling asking if they should consider evacuating, and
were told there was no problem, "Oakland is taking care of it". At 11:41 a.m., a caller asked
ous eke
were told there was no problem, "Oakland is taking care of it". At 11:41 a.m., a caller asked
about the fire location and was told, "it’s Oakland’s fire, they’re taking care of it. That’s all
the information I have." These answers were given without contacting Oakland Fire
Department. At 12:34 p.m., after the second alarm had been requested, citizens were
advised, "there have been no evacuations, as far as I know". This information was given
even though the first Berkeley Fire Department officer on the scene had told the dispatcher,
at 12:16 p.m., to have the Police Department begin immediate evacuation of the area.
Communications to Oakland Fire Department were hampered because the direct-dial
TAC (Tactical) Line which usually links East Bay fire departments was not operational.
The TAC line is a direct-dial line connecting 12 East Bay agencies. The line had been non-
operational for approximately two weeks prior to the fire. The microwave path for the TAC
line had been disrupted because of new construction between the line-of-sight microwave
towers. Rerouting of the transmission loop is expected to take several months to complete.
B. ALARMS
It is customary fire service practice to number sequentially, as alarms, the requests
for, and dispatch of, resources. Each subsequent alarm after the first is generally filled by
a like complement of resources, i.e, engines, trucks, tank wagons and patrol wagons. Both
Berkeley and Oakland follow these common practices. For example, if the first alarm
assignment is for three engines, one truck and a Chief, the second alarm will be filled by
three engines, one truck, and, where available, another Chief.
1. Oakland
Within a period of 24 minutes (11:02 am to 11:26 am) Oakland’s “Tunnel Command
transmitted SECOND through SIXTH ALARMS. Upon dispatch of the SIXTH alarm
assignment, committed resources included three Chief Officers, 19 Engines, three truck
companies, three brush/patrol wagons, and one command van. On the THIRD alarm (11:04
a.m.), the incident commander requested a California Department of Forestry (CDF)
response. Standard CDF response to an urban-wildland mutual aid request is one helitac
unit, two engines, one dozer and one Battalion Chief. A CDF helitac unit includes pilot,
co-pilot observer, a crew chief and eight Firefighters.
On the SIXTH alarm, the Incident Commander also requested five mutual aid
engines. The mutual aid request was filled through Oakland Fire Department
Communication Center by direct contact with Alameda, Alameda Naval Air Station,
Emeryville, Lawrence Berkeley Lab, and San Leandro. Everyone associated with Oakland’s
command-communication structure assumed that Berkeley was already involved.
“The Incident Commander dubbed this the "Tunnel Fire" due to the proximity of the
Caldecott Tunnel.
a2
Oakland’s SECOND ALARM was transmitted by the Company Officer of Engine 19.
No reporting location was specified, but there had been sufficient radio traffic from the fire
scene as to leave no doubt about the location of need. Subsequent alarm assignments were
directed to the Incident Command Post on Grizzly Peak Boulevard near Marlborough
Terrace. The FOURTH ALARM (between 11:15 a.m. and 11:25 a.m.) assignment was
redirected to the Parkwood Apartments. The SIXTH ALARM assignment was redirected
to Bay Forest Drive.
The redirections resulted from the rapidly changing conditions. Some responding
units were reassigned to the upper Rockridge area, others couldn’t get through the
evacuation congestion and closed roads. In seeking alternate routes, they encountered fire
conditions requiring defensive fire-fighting to protect evacuees and preserve a route of
escape.
From about the time of the FOURTH ALARM, Oakland’s two radio frequencies
were saturated. There was a constant stream of communication, unit-to-unit, unit-to-
command, command-to-unit, command-to-communicationcenter, andcommunication center-
to-command. There was a lot of signal over-riding (mobile overpowering portables) and
some lost transmissions due to topographical interference.
Throughout the first 12 hours of heavy operations, communications were the most
persistent problem. Individual companies often could not communicate with either their
Division Chief or the Incident Command Post. This inability to communicate often
necessitated independent and uncoordinated action. On at least one occasion, in the upper
Rockridge area, a Division Chief's request for resources was lost and may have contributed
to forced withdrawal from a perimeter control line along Ocean View.
The companies on Buckingham Boulevard at and shortly after the blow-up, struggled
frantically to control the fire and evacuate the area. As the fire quickly overran two of the
four companies, one took refuge in a swimming pool and the other retreated to Engine-8’s
location at 7235 Buckingham Boulevard. Through an extraordinary effort, crews of Engines
24 and 8 and an East Bay Regional Parks patrol unit managed to save 7200 and 7235
Buckingham Boulevard as the fire roared over and around them. Civilians who were
trapped with them were sheltered in the concrete-walled garage of 7235.
Over the next two and a half hours, the fire overran perimeter control efforts on
lower Marlborough Terrace, Bay Forest Drive, Broadway Terrace, Buena Vista Avenue and
the Parkwood Apartments. The spread was so rapid and of such intensity that there was no
opportunity to move fire-fighting resources into the Strathmore Ridge or Hiller Highlands
areas. Fire and Police personnel undertook evacuation of those areas at great personal risk.
An Oakland Fire Lieutenant recounts a woman standing on a rear deck resisting his
evacuation orders as the front of her house caught fire. During the first hour, following full
first alarm commitment, a structure ignited at the rate of one each 4.5 seconds.
Mutual Aid frequencies (WHITE Channels) were also saturated quickly as incoming
mutual aid units began arriving in numbers. During the early hours of Command Post
operation (before 3:00 pm), staffing levels resulted in some WHITE-1 transmissions being
ra oe
missed. Both Strike Team leaders and Mutual Aid company officers reported difficulty
communicating with Oakland’s command structure. Of the 372 mutual aid engine
companies which responded to this event, 329 were equipped with WHITE FIRE-1, 313 with
WHITE FIRE-2, and 301 with WHITE FIRE-3. Oakland’s Command Van is equipped for
WHITE FIRE-1 and WHITE FIRE-2.
Eagle-5 (East Bay Regional Parks Helicopter) was unable to communicate in a timely
manner with Oakland’s Command Post on either WHITE or Oakland’s fire frequencies.
It had to land near the Command Post in order to report. Due to rapidly changing
conditions, the airborne observer’s information was often negated before it could be
delivered. Oakland’s fire observer in the Police Department helicopter had similar
difficulties. Lack of sufficient command post staff to monitor operational frequencies was
the primary cause of this difficulty.
Fireground officers were able to communicate the most critical information. Overrun
positions, serious injuries, casualties, water supply problems, evacuation needs, and unit-to
unit cautions were communicated. Most radio transmissions were concise and clearly stated.
In reviewing transcripts of emergency tapes, a person unfamiliar with fireground
operations, or a particular department’s jargon, might conclude that there was confusion,
that firefighters’ communication was not effective. When the transmissions are tracked,
however, it is apparent that meaningful exchanges did take place. Frequent changes in
command, command post location and division designations all contributed to an already
confusing situation. Due to the magnitude of the emergency, there simply were not enough
Oakland Chief Officers to provide adequate division and sector command.
If each of the requests for resources was numbered sequentially as an alarm, the
Tunnel Fire would have been a 27-ALARM incident. If the number of alarms was
determined by the number of responses equivalent to the FIRST ALARM assignment, it
would have been a 107-ALARM event.
The only technical communication problem reported had to do with power supply in
Oakland’s command van. Batteries for portable radios were in high demand.
2. Berkeley
Berkeley became actively involved at 12:08 p.m., when Berkeley’s Engine 3 arrived
at Tunnel and Vicente Roads. Upon arrival, the Company Officer reported fire blowing
across Tunnel Road 100 feet south of the intersection (in Oakland). He immediately asked
for a full FIRST ALARM assignment (2 Engines, 1 Truck). The SECOND ALARM was
transmitted at 12:17 p.m. Recall of off-duty Chief Officers and staffing for reserve apparatus
was directed at 12:22 p.m. Total recall of off duty personnel was started as soon as reserve
apparatus staffing assignments were complete. The THIRD ALARM was transmitted at
12:38 p.m., followed by direct requests to Albany, Emeryville and Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratory.
- 16-
The first attempts to stop the fire’s progress were along lower Vicente and Tunnel
Roads, where seven roofs ignited almost simultaneously. The fire jumped Tunnel Road
about 12:15 p.m. The SECOND ALARM assignment set up along Roble Road at 12:30
p.m., where four roofs ignited by airborne flaming material. At 12:30 p.m., the Tunnel and
Vicente line was overrun. Resources were repositioned along Tunnel up Bridge and along
Alvarado. Mutual aid resources (Emeryville, Albany, Lawrence Berkeley, Hayward and
Alameda Naval Air Station engines and Strike Teams from Contra Costa, Marin and San
Francisco) strengthened these operations sufficiently to hold the perimeter lines. Heavy
fire-fighting continued into the morning of October 21st.
Chief Cates assumed incident command at 2:27 p.m., and established Division "A"
Tunnel Command and Division "B" Roble Command. Evacuation plans for threatened
Berkeley areas were completed Deputy Chief Salter and executed by the Berkeley Police
Department between 12:30 and 2:00 p.m.
In another action, Berkeley’s Engines 7 and 11 were sent to a reported fire at the end
of El Camino at 2:00 p.m. The fire involved three houses. Although forced to abandon
operations briefly, the firefighters were able to hold the fire with the help of civilians and
stop its further extension into either Berkeley or Oakland. By 8:00 p.m., October 20th, all
Berkeley’s fire line commanders were confident their perimeter lines would hold.
Berkeley’s fireground communications were marginally adequate. Only minor delays
in transmissions were caused by radio traffic. The tactical line between Berkeley and
Oakland was not operational during the fire period.
Unit-to-unit and command-to-unit communications were "clear text" and easily
understood. For the most part, Berkeley-Oakland Command Post communications were
through cellular phone to Berkeley’s Agency Representative at the Oakland Incident
Command Post.
C. LOCAL AID, CALL BACK, MOVE UP
Local mutual aid is provided through a formalized Alameda County Fire Mutual Aid
Plan. The county is divided into three zones: East, North and South, each with a Zone
Coordinator and an alternate Zone Coordinator chosen by the fire chiefs within each zone.
Oakland is the North Zone Coordinator, with Naval Air Station Alameda as alternate.
Resource allocation is prescribed by jurisdictions within each zone.
Between neighboring jurisdictions, there have historically been strong mutual aid
relationships. While no automatic plan is formally adopted, departments frequently cross
jurisdictional boundaries and take initial action before arrival of the responsible department.
This is particularly common between Berkeley and Oakland and Oakland and San Leandro.
During the October 20 fire, San Leandro responded to a 2-Alarm incident in East Oakland
and handled the incident without any involvement of Oakland resources.
Lalas
The mutual assistance relationship between Oakland and San Francisco goes back
to the 1860s. Between Berkeley and San Francisco, the relationship dates from 1906. No
formalized city-to-city aid agreements have been executed.
Because of mutual threat zones, direct mutual assistance is also common between
Alameda and Contra Costa communities. For the October 20 fire, Oakland’s first request
for mutual aid (11:04 a.m.) went to CDF because of the immediate need for air attack.
That request was immediately followed by a request for five mutual aid engine companies.
Oakland’s Fire Communication Center contacted Alameda, Alameda Naval Air Station,
Emeryville, Lawrence Berkeley Lab, and San Leandro.
The request for CDF resources was transmitted to Santa Clara Ranger Unit, Morgan
Hill at 11:19 a.m. The Oakland dispatcher’s unfamiliarity with air resource terminology
(asked for “air operations" which in CDF terminology is the designation for an incidents Air
Operations Director) delayed processing the request. At 11:24 a.m., CDF dispatched a Task
Force consisting of a helitac unit, two type-3 engines, a dozer and a Battalion Chief. Direct
requests were made to Contra Costa (11:34 a.m.) and San Francisco (12:31 p.m.) for 10
engines each.
Oakland’s standard operating procedures are to recall Chief Officers on the
SECOND ALARM. Recall was started at 11:07 a.m. Recall of off-duty personnel to staff
reserve apparatus was started shortly after the THIRD ALARM. General recall followed
the FOURTH ALARM and efforts to contact off-duty personnel continued throughout the
day. Off-duty personnel continued reporting for duty through 4:00 a.m., on October 21st.
Berkeley made its first requests for mutual aid to Albany (12:55), Emeryville, and
Lawrence Berkeley Lab (1:50 p.m.) for one engine from each. On one call (Emeryville)
Berkeley’s dispatch said, "We need help," to which Emeryville responded, "What kind of help
do you want?" Berkeley replied, "Whatever you have."
At 12:22 p.m., Berkeley’s Fire Chief directed the recall of chief officers and the "B"
platoon for staffing reserve apparatus (3 engines, 1 truck). Response records indicate that
reserve apparatus were staffed by 1:30 p.m.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
|] Dispatch centers in high risk areas need a supervising fire dispatcher on duty
at all times to handle multiple alarms or the outbreak of a large-scale emergency. The
dispatcher needs thorough working knowledge of fire service terminology and mutual aid
mobilization procedures.
|] Berkeley should consider separation of fire from the police dispatch function.
The volume of police-related radio and telephone traffic allows little opportunity for cross
training. To illustrate this, attention is invited to the Berkeley telephone log transcript for
October 20.
sa Qie
a Fire dispatchers need in-depth training in terminology related to the
mobilization and movement of mutual aid fire and support service apparatus and equipment.
Training should include air operations terminology, and resource status record keeping and
tracking designations.
a Dispatchers need training and delegated authority to initiate mutual aid
request/response.
t] Early allocation of radio frequency by function, operational division and
support service is of critical importance. Each frequency needs to be constantly monitored
at the command post. Switching from frequency-to-frequency to gain clear air time leaves
too much opportunity for missed information. Incident command staff cannot monitor
operational frequencies and communicate direction and control information on
administrative channels or telephone at the same time.
a Frequency management is critical in a large incident. Engine company
personnel and chief officers had a variety of mutual aid fire frequencies available in their
radios. Frequency congestion could have been reduced with better distribution of traffic on
the available frequencies.
= Dispatch centers need dedicated "outgoing-only" telephone lines with unlisted
and unpublished line numbers.
a All fire departments need frequent interagency radio communication training
and shared protocols between dispatch centers at all levels. Use of WHITE channels,
dedicated tie-lines, or other technologies should be used for real-time emergency
information exchange between centers.
eT O"e
lil. STRATEGY AND TACTICS
The fundamentals of fire protection are, in order of priority: prevention; protection
of life; protection of exposures; confinement, extinguishing, overhaul (mop-up); and
investigation. To some degree, all strategic and tactical decisions are made to accomplish
one or more of those fundamental goals. Strategic decisions are generally made by the
command staff. Tactical decisions, as a rule, are made by engine and truck company officers
in order to respond to circumstances or to carry out the strategic decision.
A. INITIAL ATTACK
On October 20, 1991, Engine Companies 19 and 24 arrived at 7185 Marlborough
Terrace at approximately 8:30 am. This response included an engine and brush wagon from
each station plus an officer and an engineer and two firefighters, for a total of four
apparatus and eight personnel. They immediately observed smoke and hot spots from two
locations on the fire area from October 19. One was on the Northeast flank and one below
the Gwin tank on the east flank. These hot spots were taken care of and the area around
them was mopped up, mixing water and mineral soil with the duff (leaves and pine needles
that accumulate over the years).
This procedure was followed each time smoke was observed. From about 9:30 to
10:30, no additional smoke was observed. During this period, an East Bay Regional Park
(EBRP) engine and brush wagon arrived, and those personnel were directed to pick up hose
on the northeast flank of the fire. EBRP assigned two of their personnel to start from the
Gwin tank and work down the east flank, dragging hose and watching for hot spots. One
EBRP officer was directed to the west flank below Malbrough Terrace to assist in dragging
hose down that side.
Both EBRP vehicles went to Buckingham Boulevard and started up the east flank.
They immediately noticed hot spots and began wetting these down with a back-pack pump
and used a McCloud tool to mix and mop-up. Just after starting this, they observed open
flame about 150 feet across the west flank of the fire. The EBRP engine was moved around
to the west flank and started a hose line up the hill from Buckingham Boulevard to the
flare-up, while the person with the back-pack walked across the hill and started working on
the flare up.
About this time, two Oakland firefighters from Engine 19 came down the West flank
from the top and helped drag hose from the EBRP engine to put out the flare-up that was
inside the old burn about five feet under a pine canopy. There was considerable duff and
unburned needle cast from the pine trees in the area. The wind had been blowing and
there was considerable build-up of unburned needles on top of the October 19th burn.
a50=
When this flare-up was knocked down, they looked back across the fire to the east
flank and observed another flare-up with open flames beneath three or four small oak trees.
The wind was now much stronger. Two of the EBRP personnel walked across the burn on
the contour and started putting out this flare-up, also inside the burn. They had a backpack
pump and a McCloud. At this same time, the homeowner from 7151 Buckingham came up
the hill with a charged garden hose and helped put out this flare-up.
Within seconds, they noticed another flare-up about 20 feet below them outside the
burn. This flare-up began to burn with five-foot high flames and spread down hill towards
Buckingham Boulevard and the house at 7151.
By this time, the EBRP engine had been moved back to the east side of 7151 and
began working on the fire coming down toward them. Engine 24 arrived at approximately
the same time, 11:05 a.m., and spotted at a hydrant in front of 7180 Buckingham Boulevard.
This hydrant is just above the turn in the road some distance east of 7151. The wind was
so strong that it turned the water stream from a deck gun 90 degrees from the fire. An
attempt was made to prevent the fire from engulfing the house at 7151 Buckingham
Boulevard without success.
The fire behavior was so extreme that two engine companies and hydrant water were
unable to save the house at 7151 Buckingham, but they were able to protect and save one
house at 7200, across the street from 7151, and a large four-story shingle structure at 7235
Buckingham Boulevard.
When the house at 7151 Buckingham burned, the fire spread in all directions: uphill
to the North and east toward Grizzly Peak; southeast across Buckingham Boulevard toward
the Parkwood Apartments complex; uphill west towards Westmoorland, Norfolk and
Marlborough Terrace. This all happened in about 20 minutes. During this period, four
alarms were sounded. The FIFTH and SIXTH ALARMS were combined and sounded at
11:26 a.m.
B. STRATEGY
Once the fire made its major run, fire resources through local and statewide mutual
aid began arriving on the scene. Positive perimeter action began. The fire continued to
spread, but the rate of spread was not as drastic as during the first hour.
The command function was very limited during the early period. The two-channel
radio system was completely overloaded, as was the telephone system--both land line and
cellular. Much of the fire suppression action was undertaken by individual engine captains
and lieutenants independently, because they could not communicate with command. This
independent action was commendable, but frequently futile since the firefighters could not
get additional resources and had to abandon blocks of houses. The Division Chiefs were
unable to communicate with units under their command without physically locating them.
All of this slowed down perimeter control.
1
In some cases, strike teams or division supervisors, did not arrive at their assigned
divisions because they became involved in other areas that needed direction. Command was
unaware that they had not reached their assigned area. The Division Supervisors were
unable to communicate with command part of the time. This resulted in some portion of
the perimeter having little or no suppression action until late in the day. When the winds
began to die down and more resources reported to the Fire Command Center, the Incident
Commander was able to develop a strategy and assign Strike Teams and resources where
they were needed.
The Command Center, Incident Commander and Operation Section Chief were able
to provide direction only when they established radio contact with their Division Supervisor.
Sometimes this was accomplished only when the Division Supervisor physically went to the
Command Center.
During the last 12 to 15 years, Berkeley and Oakland fire departments have cut
personnel, about 30 and 40 percent, respectively. Each department has reduced both the
number of in-service fire companies and company level personnel. A reduction from five
to four company members is a 25% reduction in it’s fireground personnel complement with
a corresponding reduction in tactical effectiveness. A reduction from four to three company
members reduces by one-third its fireground personnel complement. One company member
is always assigned to the engine operation. The fewer firefighters available, the greater the
time to deploy effective streams. It is more often necessary to call additional alarms just
for staffing. Both departments reinforced operating companies as quickly as possible.
To complete a strategic assignment firefighters often had to drive past threatened
homes, sometimes ignoring a home owner’s plea for help.
C. TACTICS
Throughout the fire-fighting period, individual and grouped companies did
outstanding fire control work. Positions were held to the last possible moment. Hose lines,
including S-inch, were advanced through narrow and often very steep side yards, backyards,
pathways up public stairways, and over roofs. Firefighters utilized available labor: residents,
military, visiting firefighters, off-duty school teachers and others.
Typically, as companies moved into an area, first efforts were directed to evacuating
citizens still there and using handline streams to wet down threatened areas. Most handline
nozzles employed were of more than 100 GPM capacity and, where personnel capabilities
permitted, of more than 200 gpm. In areas where water supply was sufficient, multiple
master streams (+500 GPM) were employed. Direct fire fighting was carried on in
conjunction with exposure protection when and where possible and for a number of tactical
reasons: (1) some structures could be saved, (2) reduction of heat and flame front, and (3)
a reduction in production of large flaming pieces of airborne material.
Boeke
The heavier the stream, the more effective it was for either area coverage OF
structural penetration. Streams of less than 75 GPM were not effective in most situations,
they lacked both reach and heat absorption capacity. There are several accounts of 500 and
greater GPM streams being bent 90° by the wind. Several officers commented that smooth
bore nozzles (play pipes) outperformed combination nozzles, particularly where reach was
a factor. Handlines of 1-3/4’ with 150 to 200 GPM nozzles provided a good screen for
firefighters advancing lines through narrow side yards alongside burning structures.
There were a few circumstances -- pressure by owner/occupants, frustration,
exhaustion -- in which individual engine companies concentrated their efforts on a single
house. Some even went to the point of extensive interior operations, pulling ceilings,
working on ventilation and overhaul. During the time they spent within, other houses on
either side began burning.
Landscape irrigation systems, lawn sprinklers, and garden hoses (with and without
nozzles) were utilized by firefighters to help combat flaming embers and, in at least one
case, to provide some exposure protection.
There was success with master streams for both exposure protection and direct attack.
Where water supplies were sufficient to support several large streams, in general, perimeter
lines were held. In those areas in which water supplies were lost or the distribution system
was weak, heavy reliance was placed upon tankers for water supply and heavy streams
simply could not be sustained. Preconnected deck guns were the most effective large
stream device.
Some type 3 and 4 engine crews were subjected to very high working-space
temperatures and high concentrations of fire gases because their hose and nozzle capacity
afforded such little thermal displacement. The styles of the nozzles did not permit
firefighters to place a cheek alongside to get a breath of cooler-cleaner air.
In one situation, a group of firefighters and civilians tore shingles from a burning roof
to halt the fire’s spread. Removing fuel from the path of fire is an effective control
mechanism. It worked; however, we would not recommend the adoption of this somewhat
hazardous technique as SOP.
Wildland tactics were employed wherever advantageous and/or feasible. A fire break
(dozer line) was cut from Grizzly Peak Boulevard, to the bottom of Claremont Canyon.
CDF and Contra Costa Task Forces worked Claremont Canyon hot spots during both fire
fighting and mop-up operations. Trees were felled along upper Marlborough, behind 7235
Buckingham and in several Upper Rockridge area locations to remove burning fuel, enhance
exposure protection and to create fuel breaks. The fire’s spread rate precluded any
consideration of fire break construction by dozers and/or handcrews other than along the
east and west flanks until evening.
Narrow crowded roads, steep and narrow side yards, downed power lines, and water
supply problems were cited as the most difficult tactical problems to overcome. Several
officers mentioned narrow tree-canopied streets as a factor in fire spread and made it
BoLve
difficult to direct streams for effective exposure control. One fire officer described flames
shooting horizontally across Tunnel Road about five feet above the surface and sounding
like a jet aircraft on its take-off run. There were a number of hose line failures due to the
burning or melting of three and five-inch hose.
1. Perimeter Lines
By 11:30 a.m., the fire had spread into the Parkwood Apartments, had passed through
Hiller Highlands and crossed Highway 24 below Lake Temescal. Structures along Contra
Costa Road on the south side of Highway 24 were beginning to burn. It is estimated the
fire traveled about one mile in 15 to 20 minutes. There was not sufficient time to establish
perimeters. The fire continued to spread rapidly. It is difficult to evaluate the initial attack
and tactical action during this period because of the fire’s extreme rate of spread.
2. Air Attack
Wildland fire agencies utilize air attack for "holding action" until ground resources
can arrive on location or to slow the rate of spread in inaccessible areas. Water, with an
admixture to increase viscosity, is the fire control medium. The largest air tanker can
deliver only 3000 gallons per flight. The average fire department pumper can deliver a like
amount of water in three minutes.
The East Bay Regional Parks radio log recorded a message from one of their fire
personnel on the fire at 10:52 a.m. asking for Oakland to request air support. The specific
request from the EBRP fire person (5669) was, "Talk to Oakland and have them get a
helicopter up here and get this area wet down. We are having all kinds of rekindles." This
request was followed up at 11:19 a.m., when the EBRP fire person (5675) called EBRP
Dispatch and asked them to, "Contact CDF and tell them we’re gonna need helicopters out
here."
Alma Helitac (a CDF resource) dispatched at 11:26 a.m., and arrived over the fire
at approximately 11:55 a.m. Two air tankers and an air attack aircraft were dispatched to
the Franklin Canyon fire in Contra Costa County at 11:26 a.m. This fire was six miles
northeast of the Oakland hills fire. Tanker 92 departed Fresno with an estimated ETA at
Franklin Canyon of 12:26 p.m. Air Tanker 94 and Air Attack 460 departed Salinas with an
ETA of 12:18 p.m. for Air Attack 460, and 12:23 p.m. for Air Tanker 94 at the Franklin
Canyon fire. At 12:38 p.m., Tankers 92, 94 and the Air Attack were diverted to the
Oakland hills fire. Air Attack 460 had to coordinate and gain approval from Oakland radar
approach control to enter the area and establish a restricted area. It also had to establish
radio contact with Oakland City Fire Department to get directions for the air tankers. This
created a time delay.
At 1:02 p.m. and 1:03 p.m., Air Tankers 94 and 92 dropped their respective loads of
retardant on the fire and departed for Sonoma County Airport at Santa Rosa to reload and
return. They landed at the Sonoma County Airport at 1:27 p.m. and 1:29 p.m., respectively.
DAG
At approximately 12:35 p.m., the Oakland Fire Department requested a third air
tanker and at 12:39 p.m. Tanker 77 was dispatched from Ukiah Airport with an ETA over
the fire of 1:16 p.m. At 2:30 p.m., Oakland Fire Department requested four additional air
tankers, and four CDF air tankers were immediately diverted from the Geysers fire north
of Santa Rosa. At 3:52 p.m. Oakland Fire Department requested one more air tanker, and
the order was filled immediately by CDF. At 4:04 p.m. Oakland requested an additional
air tanker and the order was filled by CDF.
Seven helicopters worked on the fire dropping water. An East Bay Regional Park
Police helicopter was used over the fire to direct some of the air traffic and provide
intelligence. It was unable to communicate over the radio, so it had to land several times
in order to pass on information to the Command Center. An Oakland Fire Department
captain was used as an observer in this aircraft, as were EBRP personnel. An Oakland
Police helicopter was also used, with an Oakland Battalion Chief flying as an observer. This
Oakland Police Helicopter’s primary function turned out to be evacuation, as it was unable
to communicate with the Command Center.
The seven helicopters dropping water dipped it from several locations: Lake
Temescal, when they could see to get into it; Lake Merritt; and a pond in the Mountain
View Cemetery. The helicopter water drops were used in the Contra Costa Road area near
Lake Temescal and along Broadway Terrace--both lower and upper. There was
questionable success as many of the drops were observed vaporizing before reaching the fire.
Early air tanker drops were made along Swainland Ridge southeast of Highway 24.
Aircraft were largely ineffective during the first three hours (11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.)
of the fire, except on the heel of the fire where the fire spread was limited, the visibility was
good, and there were no structures. The first three hours of the fire accounted for 60% to
70% of the damage.
The ineffectiveness of aircraft was due to the strong, turbulent winds, low humidities,
and continuous fuel chain of tinder-dry vegetation intermixed with structures which created
intense heat. The heavy smoke in the fire area made many potential targets difficult to
locate for drops. There is debate whether air tankers should be used in such a congested
area. The air tankers had to fly out over the city at low elevation after they dropped.
3. Division Assignment
Captain Wylie, Engine 19, was Incident Commander and Division "A", and
Lieutenant Dick was Division "B" Sunday morning for the overhaul mop-up of the Saturday
fire, beginning at about 8:30 a.m. When the fire on Sunday began to expand at about 11:00
a.m., Battalion Chief Riley was assigned to Division "A" by Incident Commander Don
Mathews. Division "A" was loosely located from the Gwin tank down Malbrough Terrace
to Buckingham Boulevard. It is not clear if there was a Division "B" at that time.
When the fire expanded and overran the forces on Buckingham Boulevard, the
division identity was lost for a period.
O52
When the Command Center was moved to Highway 24 and Broadway, Assistant
Chief John Baker became the Incident Commander and Don Mathews was the Operations
Chief. The fire had crossed Highway 24. Battalion Chief Neil Honeycutt became Division
"A", which was located from Highway 24 to the Rockridge area south of Highway 24, and
eventually was expanded through the Claremont Country Club, Clarewood Drive to
Hermosa and Arron Street and Broadway Terrace. Division "B" was assigned to Battalion
Chief Garcia and was located between Highway 24 and Roble Road.
The Berkeley Fire Department had a Division from Roble Road, across Tunnel Road
and up Alvarado Drive to approximate Eucalyptus Path above the Claremont Hotel. This
fact was not included as part of the Oakland Command Center division assignment. This
did not create problems on the fire scene.
Division "C" was originally assigned to Oakland Fire Captain Parker, and was
primarily the Claremont Hotel. A San Francisco Strike Team, under Battalion Chief Paul
Tabacco, assigned to this division moved his forces up onto Alvarado and advanced 5" lines
up Eucalyptus Path to assist Berkeley along Alvarado and Sunset. This division was later
expanded up Claremont Avenue to the junction of Alvarado Road.
Division "D" was from Broadway Terrace to Highway 13; Oakland Fire Department
Captain Ready, and Livermore Lab Fire Department Assistant Chief Magee acted as
Division Chiefs for this division. There was little contact with the Command Center, so it
was unclear who the Division Supervisor on Division "D" was at any given time.
John Eliff, CDF Battalion Chief, was assigned Branch II from Highway 13 to Skyline
Grizzly Peak Road. This assignment was not made until late Sunday afternoon around six
o’clock. Eliff was under the impression he was Branch Chief for Branch II from Highway
13 to Grizzly Peak; however, he wasn’t able to get beyond Skyline and Grizzly Peak Road.
Eliff was assisted in this assignment by retired Oakland Fire Department Assistant Chief Al
Sigwart.
D. SAFETY AND EQUIPMENT
1. Length of Shift
During the first 24 hours, fire line assignments were long. For example, Engine 24
with Lieutenant Eugene Dick and his "A" shift from station 24 were assigned the Saturday
fire on Buckingham Boulevard. They then arrived back on the fire line at 8:30 a.m. Sunday.
They remained actively involved on the fire until 1:00 p.m. Monday, when they were told
to return to their station to rest. Most of the Oakland Fire Department "A" Shift, on
Sunday, had the same lengths of shift.
This was also true of the Berkeley and Piedmont Fire Departments, as well as
Mutual Aid strike teams assigned to the October 20, fire.
Sela
2. Firefighter Safety
There were 25 fatalities -- 23 civilians, one Oakland Fire officer and one Oakland
Police officer. Credit is due to the Oakland Police and the Oakland and Berkeley Fire
Departments that there were not more fatalities.
The need for a Safety Officer position was not identified or assigned as part of the
Command Structure until after the CDF Incident Management Team arrived at 5:30 p.m.
The potential for injuries and accidents was very high due to the incident circumstances and
location: the narrow restricted access, destroyed and damaged utilities, the large volume
of extremely hazardous, dry fuels, the extreme fire behavior, and rapidly spreading fire.
There was repeated exposure to flames, smoke, downed power lines and hazardous
driving conditions at the fire scene. It is amazing that there weren’t more accidents and
injuries during the period from 11:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
3. Equipment Compatibility and Effectiveness
In most cases, equipment worked well. There were a few reports of fire engine
breakdown. Piedmont Engine 3 had to be taken out of service briefly at the Claremont
Hotel Division "C", as did Oakland Engine 1 at the Parkwood Apartments. The Piedmont
Engine was repaired and returned to service to Division "D" at about 1:30 p.m.
Oakland fire hydrants are each equipped with one or more three-inch national
standard thread outlets. Other communities throughout California utilize hydrants with one
or more 2-1/2 inch national standard thread outlets. Since 2-1/2 inch is the accepted
standard, few of California’s engines carry 3" x 2-1/2" adapters. A more expedient means
of adapting hydrant outlets from three to 2-1/2 inch NST is needed. This is particularly
important on those hydrants not equipped with pumper (steamer) outlets. The group
recommends investigating the feasibility of installing 3" F to 2-1/2" M adapter with a break-
away cap, the adapter staying on the hydrant at all times. This would solve the adapter
problem and allow Oakland to retain the advantages of the three-inch outlets.
There were some operational problems because Mutual Aid engine companies which
were supplied by hydrant adapters had to abandon them at some locations. They had to
leave hose and hardware or be overrun by the fire. When they needed to hook to hydrants
at another location they sometimes couldn’t get adapters.
E. WATER AVAILABILITY
Discussions with East Bay Municipal Utility District revealed that nine pressure zones
were affected by the fire on October 20, 1991. There are one or more reservoirs within
each pressure zone. The reservoirs vary in capacity from 400,000 gallons to over 1,000,000
gallons. The reservoirs are linked by pumping stations which are activated by draw-downs
from the individual reservoirs. The basic design of the system capacity is based on three
eT =
factors: the operational storage, emergency reserve, and fire flow reserve. The operational
storage is based on 0.5 x the maximum daily demand; the emergency reserve is based on
1.0 x the maximum daily demand; and the fire flow reserve is based on supplying 1500
gallons per minute for two hours.
The rapid spread in the early stages of the fire caused power failures and, as houses
were destroyed, individual house water service was ruptured. The ruptured water service
lines caused a heavy drain on reservoirs. These reservoirs were in the same pressure zone
in which hydrant water was essential for fire fighting. There was no auxiliary power supply
at any pumping station.
The first power failure within the pressure zones was recorded at 11:35 a.m. in the
Amito Cascade pressure zone. This affected the water supply to the Parkwood Apartments
complex, and the upper Alvarado, Siler, Rispin and Claremont Avenue areas. The Amito
Reservoir was not logged as empty until 2:25 p.m. The Strathmoor and Gwin Reservoirs,
which supplied Marlborough Terrace, Norfolk, Strathmoor, and Buckingham Boulevard
hydrants, were not reported empty until 3:30 p.m.
When the Parkwood Apartments complex burned, with subsequent ruptured water
pipes, there was a major drain on reservoirs in the Amito Pressure Zone. It would be
impractical to plan a system that would handle such a demand. Suppression efforts had to
be abandoned in the Marlborough Terrace, Norfolk area when hydrants stopped flowing.
This was approximately 12:30 p.m.
Fire suppression efforts in the upper Alvarado, Siler, and Rispin areas were slowed
when hydrants went dry. Water had to be transported by water tenders and other fire
engines to the engine company working in this area.
The fire-fighting efforts in the Buena Vista, Golden Gate, Ocean View, and upper
Broadway Terrace areas were slowed by the heavy draw-down on the four-inch main grid.
The water supply was not sufficient to maintain the suppression effort. It was necessary to
back off block by block until water supply resources were adequate to support necessary
heavy fire fighting streams.
Most of the water supply problems experienced in this fire were predictable. Some
could have been avoided with automatic standby power or auxiliary pumping installations.
The old water mains in upper Rockridge should have been upgraded before building
densities reached that which existed at the time of the fire. The rupturing of the hundreds
of service connections which drained the Amito Gwin and Strathmore reservoirs could not
reasonably have been predicted.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
= Oakland’s and Berkeley’s operational level command staffs are overextended
even without a large-scale emergency. The recognized standard for span of control in the
ete
fire service is one chief officer for each five to eight operational companies. Berkeley
currently operates seven engines, three trucks, and three ambulances with only one chief
officer on duty outside normal business hours. Oakland operates 23 engines, seven trucks,
and six tank wagons deployed in three battalions each commanded by a chief officer.
Clearly, within each, there is a need for another battalion level division.
m Oakland should consider appointing a Deputy Chief. Currently, Oakland’s
battalion two is commanded by an assistant chief who also serves as duty chief for the entire
city and as department head in the absence of the chief of the department. A deputy chief
level position would enhance inter-platoon coordination to insure and better preserve unity
of command concepts.
E Investigate the feasibility of installing 3" F to 2-1/2" M adapters with a
breakaway cap on all hydrants.
ial Agencies providing air tankers and water dropping helicopters should provide
urban fire departments with guidelines for safe air operations. These guidelines should spell
out the limitations of the aircraft during high winds, smokey conditions and difficult
topography.
a Before reconstruction is permitted in the upper Rockridge area, the water grid
should be upgraded sufficiently to produce a fire flow consistent with building size and
density with no single fire hydrant flowing less than 750 GPM when any two hydrants are
flowed simultaneously. Emergency back-up for refilling upper water zones should be
changed to a permanently installed auxiliary pumping system. Reliance upon
portable/transportable pumps is not realistic for the Oakland-Berkeley hills area. Access
cannot be assured.
2 All fire departments should maintain, at dispatch center operating positions,
a list of locally available water tankers (contractors, aggregate and concrete suppliers).
720 2
IV. MUTUAL AID SYSTEM
A. BACKGROUND
The provision of mutual aid is an evolutionary process. The jurisdiction in which an
emergency arises first commits its own resources. It the obtains additional resources first
from neighboring jurisdictions, and then (sequentially) from the Operational Area, Region
and Inter-region system until there are resources sufficient to deal with the emergency.
Inter-regional resources are mobilized through the State Fire and Rescue Coordinator,
Office of Emergency Services.
Mutual Aid is mobilized in accordance with the California Fire and Rescue Mutual
Aid Plan. The state is divided into six Mutual Aid Regions. Each of the several counties
within a region is an Operational Area. Fire chiefs within each Operational Area elect a
fire chief from among them to serve as the Operational Area Coordinator. The fire
department of which the Operational Area Coordinator is Chief is generally the area’s
Dispatch Center. Regional Coordinators are chosen by the Area Coordinators within each
region.
The statewide mutual aid system is structured in a manner which insures mobilization
of sufficient resources without reducing to an unacceptable level of risk the fire and rescue
resources within any Operational Area. All mutual aid requests are channeled through the
Operational Area Coordinator. Chief John Sharry, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Fire
Department, is the Operational Area Coordinator for Alameda County. That Department’s
Dispatch Center serves as the Operational Area Dispatch Center (LAB).
Requests for fire and rescue resources must specify the quantity, classification (kind),
and type (capacity/capability) of each resource, a specific reporting location, reporting
frequency and travel directions. Resource classification and typing are in accordance with
the FIRESCOPE-developed Incident Command System (ICS) Operations Guide. The most
commonly requested fire mutual aid resources are engine companies. Mobilization of
engine companies is normally in groups of five, each with a Chief Officer in command. Such
a resource group is designated a Strike Team and the group’s Chief Officer is the Strike
Team Leader. When dissimilar resources are grouped for mobilization or deployment
purposes, they are designated a Task Force. The officer in command of a task force is the
Task Force Leader.
To speed the mobilization process, most Operational Areas have predesignated Strike
Team composition and Strike Team Leader sources. Each zone in Alameda County has
developed predesignated strike teams.
a8 (2
B. SYSTEM USE ON OCTOBER 20
The first request to mutual aid coordinator dispatch on October 20 was received at
11:40 a.m., from Oakland’s Fire Communication Office. The request stated "We have a
major wildland fire out of control and we need five strike teams." There followed a four-
minute exchange between the coordinator and Oakland in order for the dispatcher to get
information sufficient to start mobilization, i.e., classification, type, and reporting location.
Due to radio and telephone traffic and established mutual aid mobilization protocol,
there followed a seven-minute time lapse before the mutual aid coordinator started notifying
resource suppliers. It is noteworthy that the mutual aid coordinator instituted protocol
changes to speed mobilization while this emergency was unfolding.
During the period between 11:40 a.m., October 20th, and 5:00 p.m., October 23rd,
the mutual aid coordinator processed 17 requests. Requests included 88 engine strike teams
(440 engine companies and 88 Chief Officers), six air tankers, 16 helitac units, eight
communication resources, two management teams and support, two mechanics and two
search and rescue teams. This is the largest mobilization of mutual aid resources for a
single fire in the history of the system.
Alameda County East and South Zone provided six engine strike teams. Mutual Aid
Regions II, III, IV AND V provided engine strike teams as follows: Region II - 33; Region
III - 10; Region IV - 18; and Region V - 10.
Regional and inter-regional mobilization included resources from 244 local; 4 military
and two statewide agencies. The total number of personnel responding with these resources
was 1,539. Thirty of the strike teams mobilized were for "planned need." The period from
the time of request to the time of assembly at rendezvous varied from 51 minutes to two
hours and 51 minutes. Travel time from rendezvous to reporting location ranged from 34
minutes to six hours and 50 minutes. Distance traveled from home town to reporting
location ranged from 12 to 365 miles.
Twenty-seven strike teams responded directly to the fire. Thirty-eight reported to a
Staging area and nine reported to the Mobilization Center. Those reporting directly to the
incident responded Code 3 (emergency, red lights and sirens). Of those reporting directly,
two reported to Division Commands, seven received assignments at the Incident Command
Post, and two reported to Branch Managers. Other teams received assignments by radio,
at time of departure from the rendezvous point, or by direct contact with a host
department’s representative upon or shortly after arrival.
Of the individual units responding, 204 (697%) were assigned a travel frequency. One
hundred seventy-one (59%) were provided with an incident reporting frequency. Two
hundred fifty-nine (907%) were able to communicate with the Strike Team Leader by radio.
Two hundred forty-four were equipped for WHITE-1 communication. Thirty-six of the
responding units felt their assignment instructions were not clearly stated. Twenty-nine units
had radio communication difficulty resulting from poor radio procedure; 46 units reported
el ee
radio communication problems as a result of not having the proper frequencies. Sixteen
units reported radio equipment failure.
Seventeen of the responding units had difficulties within their strike team. A variety
of factors contributed to these few difficulties: exhaustion, rumors, confusion, injuries, and
failure to follow instructions.
Eighty-eight percent of the engine companies actively engaged in fire fighting and
were able to complete their assignment. Downed power lines were the most common
operational problems (185), with water supply (165) and narrow steep roadways (132)
running a close second and third. Lack of proper adapters and hydrants without sufficient
residual pressure or running dry were, in that order, the most commonly voiced water supply
problems. Many companies reported no contact with command structure after initial
assignments.
At least one strike team was not given an assignment for more than 24 hours after
arrival. Many reported three to nine-hour waits.
There were a few incidents in which Strike Team Leaders would not allow one or
more of their engine companies to be utilized as single resource(s). In crossing an area
enroute to assignment, this is a commendable and totally correct posture for a Strike Team
Leader; however, when the Strike Team has reported to a Division or Sector Chief and
particular objectives can best be accomplished by deployment in other than strike team
configuration, it is important that Division and Sector Chiefs have the latitude to order the
change. It is the responsibility of both officers to reunite strike team components at the
earliest practical moment.
A number of Strike Team Leaders were puzzled that more of them were not given
Sector or Division Chief roles in those areas which could not be adequately covered by the
host department.
Despite difficulties experienced, mutual aid resources were effectively deployed.
Where necessary, strike team leaders took the initiative to organize and coordinate
perimeter defense operations. Cooperation between individuals and groups was exemplary.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
as All fire service agencies, even the largest, must develop protocols and plan for
"worst case" scenarios.
a There is a universal need for more frequent mutual aid mobilization exercises.
Exercises need to be real time. Rendezvous inspection, travel frequency assignment, and
in-transit communication practice should be included.
Loe
a The prearranged strike team commitments should include a strike team leader
designee. A rotating schedule among operational area/zone providers should be developed.
& OES should develop procedures and technology to optimize the speed and
capability of the state’s mutual aid systems, particularly in catastrophic situations.
a Improve inter-regional alerting protocols. More lead time is needed for
resources likely to be mobilized.
8 When specialized resources are requested, those receiving such requests should
begin moving the resource(s) immediately, clarifying details with the requestor only after
initiating response.
al All fire departments need to plan for receiving massive mutual aid, including
ordering, reporting, staging, deployment, supporting and demobilization protocols.
= Interagency multiple company exercises for wildland-structural mix fire
operations must become part of the regular training schedule. All operational level
personnel should attend at least one such exercise each year. Exercise should include a
briefing of company level personnel on what to expect on a large scale incident.
= Cities and state agencies should establish automatic mutual aid, boundary
drops, and interagency response protocols for mutual threat zones.
= All agencies should become thoroughly familiar with the protocols, procedures
and terminology used to request air support.
eee
AHWANEE FD
ALAMEDA CFW
ALAMEDA FD
ALAMEDA NAS
ALBANY FD
ALTO RICHDSON BAY FPD
AMADOR FPD
AMERICAN CANYON FPD
AMERICAN RIVER FPD
ANDERSON FPD
APTOS/LA SELVA FPD
AROMAS TRI CO FPD
ARTOIS FPD
BELLEVUE FPD
BENICIA FD
BETHEL ISLAND FPD
BOULDER CREEK FPD
BRANCIFORTE FPD
BURBANK-PARADISE FPD
BURLINGAME FD
BURNEY FPD
BUTTE CO FD
BYRON FD
CALAVERAS FD
CALAVERAS CO FD
CAMPBELL FD
CASTRO VALLEY FPD
CDF-MAD/MERCED/MAR
CLEMENTS RURAL FPD
CLOVIS FD
COLMA FPD
COLOMA LOTUS FPD
COLUSA RURAL FPD
CONTRA COSTA CO FD
COPPEROPOLIS FPD
CORDELIA FPD
CORTE MADERA FD
COTATI FPD
COTTONWOOD FPD
COURTLAND FPD
CROCKETT-CARQ FPD
DALY CITY FD
DEFENDER FD
DELTA FPD
(SACRAMENTO CO)
DELTA FPD
(SAN JOAQUIN CO)
DIXON FD
DORRIS FD
DOUGHTERY REG FA
DRY CREEK VOL FPD
EAST BAY REGIONAL PARK
EAST DIABLO FPD
EL CERRITO FD
EL DORADO CO FPD
EL MEDIO FPD
ELK GROVE CSD
ESCALON CONS FPD
EXETER FD
FAIR OAKS FPD
EAST BAY HILLS FIRE
MUTUAL AID RESPONDERS
FAIRFIELD DPS
FAIRVIEW FPD
FIG GARDEN FPD
FLORIN FPD
FOLSOM FD ee
FOLSOM PRISON FD
FOSTER CITY FD
FREMONT FD
FRESNO FD
GALT FD
GEORGETOWN FPD -
GILROY FD
GUSTINE VOL FD
HALF MOON BAY FPD
HAMILTON CITY FD
HAPPY CAMP FPD
HAYWARD FD
HEALDSBURG FD
HILLSBOROUGH FD
HUGHSON FPD
INDUSTRIAL FPD
ISLETON FD
JACKSON FD
JACKSON VALLEY FPD
KINGS CO FD
KLAMATH RIVER VOL FD
LAKE VALLEY FPD
LARKSPUR FD
LAWRENCE-BERK LAB FD
LAWRENCE-LIV LAB FD
LIBERTY RURAL FPD
LINDA FD
LIVE OAK FD
LIVE OAK, CSA #A
LIVERMORE FD
LOCKHEED FD
LOS ALTOS FD
MADERA FD
MADERA CO FD
MANTECA FD
MANTECA-LATHROP FPD
MARE ISLAND FD
MARIN CO FD
MARINWOOD FD
MARYSVILLE FD
MAXWELL FPD
MENLO PARK FPD
MERCED CO FD
MERCED FD
MERIDIAN FD
MID-VALLEY FPD
MILL VALLEY FD
MILLBRAE FD _
MILLVILLE VFC
MILPITAS FD
MODESTO FD
MOFFETT FIELD FD
MORAGA FPD
MORGAN HILL CITY FD
MOUNTAIN GATE FD
MOUNTAIN VIEW FD
MT SHASTA VISTA FC
MURPHYS FPD
NAPA CO FD
NAPA FD
NAVAL AIR STATION FD
NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER
NEWARK
NEWCASTLE FPD
NORTH CENTRAL FPD
. NOVATO FPD
OAKDALE FPD
OAKHURST FD
OAKLEY FPD
OLIVEHURST PUD
ORINDA FPD
OROVILLE FD
OSWALD-TUDOR FD
PACIFIC FPD
PACIFICA FD
PALO ALTO FD
PARADISE FD
PENNGROVE FPD
PETALUMA FD
PIEDMONT FD
PINE GROVE CSD
PINOLE FD
PLACER FOOT CO FPD
PLACER HILLS FPD
PLEASANTON FD
PLUMAS-BROPHY FPD
POINT MONTARA FPD
POLLOCK PINES FD
PORTERVILLE FD
QUINCY FPD
REDDING FD
REDWOOD CITY FD
RICHMOND FD
RINCON VALLEY FPD
RIO VISTA FD
RIVERVIEW FPD
RODEO-HERCULES FPD
ROHNERT PARK DPS
ROSS VALLEY FD
SACRAMENTO CFPD
SACRAMENTO FD
SALIDA FPD
SALSIPUEDES FPD
SAN ANTONIO FD
SAN BENITO CO FD
SAN BRUNO FD
SAN FRANCISCO FD
SAN JOSE FD
SAN LEANDRO FD
SAN MATEO CO FD
SAN MATEO FD
SAN RAFAEL FD
SAN RAMON VALLEY FPD
SANGER FD
SANTA CLARA CO FD
SANTA CLARA FD
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SANTA ROSA FD
SARATOGA FPD
SAUSALITO FD
SCOTTS VALLEY FD
SELMA FD
SKYWALKER RANCH FB
SONORA FD
SOUTH COUNTY FA
SOUTH PLACER FPD
SO SAN FRANCISCO FD
SO SANTA CLARA CFD
ST HELENA FD
STANISLAUS CFSD
STOCKTON FD
SUISUN CITY FD
SUISUN FPD
SUNNYVALE DPS FD
SUTTER CFD
SUTTER CREEK FPD
TIBURON FPD
TRACY FD
TRUCKEE FPD
TULARE CFD
TULARE FD
TULELAKE MULTI CO FD
TUOLUMNE CO FD
TWAIN HARTE FPD
TWO ROCK USCG FD
UC DAVIS FD
US NAVY SEC GRP
UNION CITY FD
UNITED TECH CENTER
VACAVILLE FD
VACAVILLE FPD
VALLEJO FD
VISALIA FD
WALNUT GROVE FPD
WATERFD-HICKMAN FPD
WATERLOO-MORADA FPD
WATT PARK FPD
WEAVERVILLE VFD
WEST CO FPD
WEST STANISLAUS FPD
WESTSIDE FPD
WILLIAMS VOL FD
WILLOW OAK FPD
WILLOWS FD
WOODBRIDGE FPD
WOODLAND AVE FPD
WOODLAND FD
WOODSIDE FPD
YOSEMITE LAKES FD
YUBA CITY FD
YUBA CO FD
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V. INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM
The Incident Command System (ICS) was developed by the U.S. Forest Service and
participating fire agencies in Southern California during the 1970s. The California
Department of Forestry, Office of Emergency Services, Los Angeles City and the County
of Los Angeles, Orange, Santa Barbara, and Ventura Fire Departments all participated.
This system resulted in unification and coordination between multiple jurisdictions and
agencies. It was designed to function in all-risk emergency incident situations such as floods,
earthquakes, and chemical spills and has been adopted by most local government fire
agencies. This fact is shown in the results of the survey of the fire agencies that took part
in the October 20 fire.
The departments that responded to the fire report that 97% have adopted ICS and
use it routinely in their daily responses. The departments all show that they received basic
training in ICS, and that many departments have expanded their training into other areas
of the ICS. However, most of the training at local government level has been in the area
of day-to-day operations. Most local jurisdictional incidents are of a short duration and do
not require the need for the prolonged planning and logistics support that is often required
on major wildland fires and other types of major disasters.
It is unusual for local government agencies to have an incident such as the East Bay
Hills fire which requires a total effort for several days. In such situations, local government
agencies ordinarily request assistance through the Office of Emergency Services (OES)
Master Mutual Aid Agreement, as was done in this incident. As the magnitude of the fire
became apparent, an incident management team was requested to assist in the management;
this was not fully in-place until late on Sunday afternoon. Below is a breakdown of each
function of ICS, with indications of strengths and weaknesses on October 20.
A. COMMAND FUNCTION
In Berkeley and Oakland, transition of command was an evolutionary process. Each
utilized the Incident Command System which prescribes that the Incident Commander is the
first arriving company officer, then the first arriving Chief Officer, then the Senior Chief
Officers in order of rank. The Tunnel Fire transition was:
OAKLAND: Lt. Wylie --> A/C Mathews --> A/C Baker --> Chief Ewell
BERKELEY: Lt. Corrigan --> Capt Orth --> A/C Dismuke --> Chief Cates
The final evolution was to establish the joint command about 5:30 p.m. when the
California Department of Forestry management team arrived.
Berkeley’s transition was relatively smooth. Operating units were aware of command
shifts. The area of operations was not extensive.
35a
Oakland’s transition was complex and somewhat confusing during the half-hour
following the blow-up. Lt. Wylie used "Tunnel Command", "Engine 19" and "Pumper 19
interchangeably as his identifier depending upon his function at the time of a transmission.
The command post location selected by A/C Mathews was overrun before it could be fully
established, radio frequencies were completely overloaded, and both the second and third
command post sites proved untenable shortly after people arrived.
The organizational Incident Command Post was located on Highway 24 just west of
the Caldecott Tunnel. The chiefs or their representatives from the cities involved were at
the Incident Command Post operating together when the CDF Incident Management Team
arrived, at approximately 1730 hours on October 20, 1991. At that time the incident was
already organized into three branches and approximately nine divisions. When all members
of the management team had arrived, they conferred with the chiefs of the respective
agencies involved to determine the needs and priorities necessary to organize and manage
the incident under a unified command system.
Prior to 1730 hours on October 20, 1991, the incident command function operated
with the Incident Commander and the Operations Section Chief. During this period, some
of the duties of the Planning Section Chief and Logistics Section Chief were done by the
Incident Commander and the Operations Section Chief, with the assistance from company
officers. These positions were not filled until the CDF incident management team arrived.
There were two apparent problems to deal with. The first was the need to provide
accurate and timely information to the public, media, members of the city councils, mayors’
offices, and other legislative bodies. It was necessary to appoint an Incident Information
Officer immediately to work for the Incident Commander so that information could be
supplied to the media and other people involved in an efficient and timely manner. This
information office was established in the City of Oakland. All requests for information were
routed through the unified information system in order to maintain legitimacy and accuracy
until the incident was demobilized.
The second need was for a Safety Officer. Due to the narrow and/or restricted
streets and access, destroyed and damaged utilities, aerial fuels, and the fast- moving wind-
driven fires, a large number of fire service accidents, injuries or deaths were possible. To
remedy this situation, the Safety Officer was given authority to stop any incident activity he
deemed unsafe.
B. OPERATIONS SECTION
When the Incident Management Team arrived, the Operations Section Chief was
located with the Incident Commander and was verifying all of his moves with the Incident
Commander. It was necessary to order additional overhead staff to provide relief for people
who had been on scene since the beginning of the incident. The Operations Chiefs, Branch
Directors, and Division Supervisors were all relieved by late evening on the 20th and most
of these positions were filled by CDF overhead staff. When local government personnel
were rested, they returned to their assignments. Within three shifts, the cities had staffed
all line overhead positions and were satisfied with the interaction of the other incident
management sections.
236).
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C. PLANNING SECTION
The Planning Section was set up once the Incident Management Team was in place.
This section was staffed by CDF personnel during the first three shifts. Local personnel
were also assigned to the Planning Section and through a training process learned the
function and duties of the Section. By the third shift, the city personnel took on the
responsibility of formulating and documenting the plan and conducting all meetings. The
incident was basically managed by the cities from that point on. However, CDF continued
to handle the demobilization process because of the number of resources assigned to the
incident, and CDF’s recognized capability in this regard.
A major obstacle encountered by the Planning Section was the scarcity of information
on initial attack resources, i.e., what resources had been ordered, and by whom. Since the
bulk of the resources came through the mutual aid system, the Planning Section was
eventually able to find and account for all resources by the end of the second shift. The
perimeter map of the fire was easy to establish, but the collection of data on lost and
damaged structures required a large commitment of personnel. An accurate assessment
proved to be the largest hurdle for the planning section’s situation status unit.
D. LOGISTICS SECTION
The logistics needs for this incident were especially difficult. The Incident Command
Post and Base Camp had to be moved during the incident and 375+ engines and 2,000+
personnel had to be cared for. CDF staff were assigned to the Logistics Section since most
local government agencies do not have personnel that are trained for that assignment in a
major incident. Routinely, they do not have the need to provide long-term housing, bedding,
and maintenance of equipment in the quantities required.
Local government agencies, including public works and other city/county
departments, should be provided with ICS logistics training. This would provide a trained
cadre that would be available to support the logistics functions of major incidents in a much
more efficient manner.
E. FINANCE SECTION
Determining who pays for what and who has the authority to decide was likewise
difficult. When numerous entities are required to work together, there is a critical need
to establish a clear and concise procedure for determining who pays for what and who has
the authority to authorize those payments. Local government agencies, both fire and non-
fire, should make ICS Finance Section training mandatory for personnel who are in positions
that may involve working with financial commitments between agencies.
To further complicate this function, a thorough knowledge of state and federal
disaster proclamations and accompanying funding requirements is necessary.
==
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
= In this incident the ICS functioned as it should. However, more training on
major incident management is required. More inter- and intra-departmental training
sessions and drills using the ICS are indicated.
a Incompatible communications systems reduced the overall effectiveness of the
Incident Command System. While not specifically a function of ICS, communications
capabilities always play a major part in successful command and control of any incident.
a The ICS organizational structure should include a communications function
with responsibility for frequency allocation and management.
w Frequent exercises in the transition from single resource to large multi-agency
incidents are needed to hone the skills of both command and support staff. Particular
attention should be directed toward establishment and staffing of operations, logistics,
finance and planning sections and to internal command post communication.
i Exercises should include establishment of branches, division, and sectors within
the operations section to provide an opportunity for officers to gain practical experience in
those operational roles.
a More attention should be paid to the critical interface between the field
functions (Incident Command, Incident Command Post) and the Emergency Operating
Center. Information and intelligence must be shared as it is gathered.
- 38 -
VI. EVACUATIONS
Residents evacuated for three reasons: the fire department ordered them; the police
department ordered them; or they decided on their own. During the early stages of the
incident in the City of Oakland, evacuation was primarily initiated by the Fire Department
personnel. However, the intensity of the situation motivated a number of residents in the
immediate area to leave their homes of their own accord.
Within the three cities involved, evacuation is the primary responsibility of the local
Police Department. As the incident progressed and the dangers became apparent, the
Police Departments assumed this role.
Both fire and police personnel would benefit from joint training centered around
Statutes and authority to effect evacuation. The public believes the Fire Department is
responsible for fire evacuation.
Evacuations were done on a one-on-one basis by residents and officials, door-to-door.
Public address systems were used where available and practical. During the early stages of
the incident in Oakland, Fire and Police Field Commanders had to make decisions between
concentrating on evacuation or fire control efforts. Most chose fire control efforts in an
attempt to abate the immediate danger. Non-ambulatory residents had to be identified by
word of mouth and transported to a safe area by passing motorists. By late Sunday
afternoon, evacuation efforts were more organized. Areas were blocked off and perimeter
control established by the Police. Entry was denied to all but emergency personnel.
Residents were evacuated to pre-identified areas.
Although fire personnel are not primarily responsible for evacuation, the fact remains
that they will have continued involvement. The public address system is an effective tool,
but some engine companies did not have public address systems.
A. WHAT HINDERED EVACUATIONS
1. Fire Behavior
Fire and Police Department personnel, as well as residents, were not accustomed to
dealing with such extreme fire conditions. High winds moving dense smoke made it
extremely difficult to determine exactly where the fire was. Residents did not know which
way to go to get out of danger. Fire personnel could see only what was burning in their
immediate area, which made it difficult to know where to send residents and where to move
to their next assignment.
2. Ingress/Egress
The fire was in a mountainous area with limited access. Most of the roads leading
into the fire area were narrow and winding, and many terminated in cul-de-sacs. In some
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cases, fire apparatus could not pass one another on the same road. Around large apartment
complexes, where roads were considered to be fully adequate, traffic jams resulted from the
mass of people moving to a safe area. Downed power lines significantly impeded
evacuation efforts. In some cases, fire apparatus and private vehicles were trapped in areas
for several hours. Smoke severely limited vision and further complicated any movement 1n
the fire area. These conditions, coupled with the fact that many fire personnel from out
of the area were not familiar with the complex road system, caused a number of people to
become disoriented and lost in their attempts to evacuate or find their next assignment.
3. Public Perceptions
Some residents simply did not understand the gravity of the situation, refusing to
evacuate until the last possible moment. Evacuees were not instructed before, during, or
after how to leave their homes--whether to lock doors, leave windows open or leave keys
in vehicles.
4. Communications
During the early stages of the fire, communications between Oakland operational
level fire and police personnel was on a one-on-one basis. Having no common radio
frequency significantly affected the evacuation process. Adjustments to the evacuation
efforts in anticipation of the fire movement therefore were slow and irregular. It should be
noted the common frequencies are available at the Chief Officer level.
Because of the firespread pattern, Berkeley and Piedmont had more time to
anticipate evacuation needs and put plans in effect. Discussions with representatives from
all three departments make it evident that there was very little if any communication before
or during the incident regarding plans or need for evacuation.
All entities would benefit from an informational exchange meeting well in advance
of the next disaster. Such a meeting should include levels of responsibility, authorities, local
procedures, automatic/mutual aid agreements, and plans.
The Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) was not used by any entity involved in the
fire. After discussions with representatives from all three cities, it is apparent there is a
need for more training in this area. (See the EBS discussion in the Emergency Management
section.)
5. Re-entry into Restricted Areas
After initial evacuation some people returned to their residences despite the efforts
of public officials to keep them out. The residents wanted to check on lost or unaccounted-
for friends or relatives, remove additional items from their homes, or see if their homes had
burned. This increased the number of people in the area and required re-evacuation.
6. Unauthorized Observers
Despite efforts by police and fire officials, on-lookers became a problem. The fire
activity was highly publicized on local television and radio stations. The knowledge of the
A) 2
activity was enough to attract curious folks from outside the area. These people had no
specific destination and added to the traffic congestion in the fire area.
7. Limited Resources
Both Police and Fire Department resources were overwhelmed. When personnel
were available to commit to a given area, evacuation and security efforts were successful.
But the rapidly changing fire conditions made it extremely difficult to distribute resources
effectively.
8. Security/Looters
Fire Department personnel observed a few civilians posing as volunteers to gain
access to the fire area, then taking the opportunity to commit robbery/burglary. When
possible, fire or police officials took action to remove the offenders.
B. EXISTING PLANS
The City of Oakland has an evacuation plan written in 1980. The Cities of Berkeley
and Piedmont did not have a written evacuation plan in place at the time of the incident.
City officials utilized a general disaster preparedness plan as a foundation for evacuation
efforts.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
= Both fire and police personnel would benefit from joint training on statutes
and authority to effect evacuation.
a Though fire personnel are not primarily responsible for evacuation, the fact
remains they will continue to have involvement. A loud speaker system should be on fire
apparatus to accomplish this.
si Oakland and Berkeley operational level police and fire personnel should
jointly resolve issues of responsibility, authority, local procedures, automatic mutual aid
agreements and plans.
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Vil. VOLUNTEERS
Firefighters, police officers, and individual members of the community responded
with inspiring dedication and heroism to fire-related tasks on October 20, 1991. To examine
the role and actions of those who volunteered their skills and services during the initial
operational period of the fire, random interviews were conducted.
Several California statutes govern the use of volunteer firefighters during local
emergencies. The legal liabilities that are assumed and the various protections provided
under California law are designed to protect the service requester and individual volunteer.
These statutes may be found in the Califomia Labor Code and Government Codes.
Volunteers historically have been used during major emergencies.
A. OFFICIAL VOLUNTEERS
The Alameda County Sheriffs Department administers the County Office Of
Emergency Services Volunteer Fire Department. The Sheriffs Search and Rescue
Organization also operates under this organizational structure. The firefighters are classed
as volunteers and the search and rescue members are considered disaster workers under the
Government Code. Both of these organizations were called to respond to the fire shortly
after noon October 20, 1991.
The Alameda County OES Volunteer firefighters responded as parts of three
separate Task Forces drawn from the county East Mutual Aid Zone. The volunteers
supplied two wildland patrols and a structural engine. They made a significant contribution
to the early fire control efforts in the Broadway Terrace area of Oakland and in the City
of Berkeley.
Members of the Alameda County Sheriffs Department Search and Rescue
Organization were dispatched to Oakland, where they worked to establish the main "Incident
Staging Area" in Raimondi Park at 18th and Wood Street. They staffed the "check-in"
function at staging supporting several Oakland Fire Department personnel from 1430 Hrs
through 2400 Hrs, October 20, 1991. They were then relieved by elements of the Overhead
Management Team. During the early phase of the incident, a massive influx of resources
was organized, inventoried, and assigned to provide for the final containment of the Fire.
Several jurisdictions within Alameda County have enhanced their Emergency
Dispatching Function through the application of Computer Aided Dispatching Systems. The
cities of Oakland and Livermore use a common manufacturer’s hardware and software
system in their geographically separate emergency dispatching activities for fire departments.
Several "CAD-Qualified Emergency Dispatchers" offered to go to Oakland and assist the
Oakland Fire Department dispatchers with the "Call Taker Function" the afternoon of
October 20, 1991.
B45
B. SPONTANEOUS VOLUNTEERS
Spontaneous volunteers from the threatened communities also came forward to help
with fire-fighting at the engine company level. They worked on the fire perimeter, receiving
guidance from members of the Oakland, Berkeley, and Piedmont Fire Departments.
A Berkeley Fire Department Officer recognized the need for immediate assistance
to supplement the city’s on-duty firefighters. At the Berkeley Staging Area he assigned a
significant number of "spontaneous volunteers" to assist in the fire control efforts. ‘The news
media photographically documented their stand to slow the westerly spread of fire on
Alvarado Road.
When the fire threatened to spread through the neighborhood located along
Florence, Modoc and Morpeth Street, south of Broadway Terrace, five additional
spontaneous volunteers came forward to help in slowing the fire’s progress. Four of them
were from the Alameda Naval Air Station and one was a Marine Corps officer related to
a resident. They worked collectively and separately to extinguish at least five separate roof
and landscaping fires with borrowed garden hoses and shovels. Any one of the spot fires
would have significantly increased the number of dwellings lost. Firefighters in this area had
no one else to turn to for additional help.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
a The Incident Commander and command structure must be prepared to deal
with the spontaneous voluntary offers of help and resources early in an incident.
a Planning for how to organize and where to focus the profuse outpouring of
spontaneous help should create an incident organizational element to accept the voluntary
resources.
& A policy should be developed and widely communicated throughout each
emergency organization providing for the successful use of volunteers during major incidents.
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Vill. MOP-UP
A. SATURDAY
In reviewing mop-up operations, it is necessary to examine both the conflagration of
October 20th and the fire of Saturday, October 19th. The Saturday fire was discovered and
reported by an East Bay Regional Park (EBRP) helicopter pilot on an overflight about
11:45 a.m. In his report to EBRP, he described a fire in what appeared to be a pile of scrap
lumber. The exact location turned out to be in the rear of 7151 Buckingham Boulevard.
The fire went from one to five alarms within 30 minutes. It burned off an area of no more
than three acres before being brought under control in about three hours by an aggressive
attack from 16 engine companies, four patrol wagons, and a helitac unit. All engines were
released by 6:30 p.m. Both Oakland and East Bay Park District personnel returned to the
fire during the course of the evening to check for hot spots.
In controlling the Saturday fire, great reliance was placed upon wet lines around the
perimeter. Only one section of fire line (cold trail) construction was undertaken about 350
feet downward from Grizzly Peak Boulevard along the eastern flanks (CDF helitac crew).
The rest of the perimeter was thoroughly soaked with hose lines and helicopter water drops.
Within and just outside the burn along the east, south and west flanks there was fairly dense
coverage by Monterey pines. Duff under these pine trees was cited by firefighters as having
been a foot or more deep.
After having suffered the heat of fire, pine trees produce greater than normal needle
cast, which adds fresh kindling to the accumulated duff. When a fire moves through duff,
the top layer burns freely. As the fire penetrates into the more compacted material, it
begins to starve for oxygen and is reduced to smoldering. When water is applied to the
surface, flames are extinguished. The water combines with ash and charcoal to form a crust,
but smoldering continues under the crust. Smoldering in such crust-protected material may
continue for days, and sometimes weeks.
There were several flare-ups during Sunday morning’s mop-up in heavy duff under
trees. Crews were treating (mixing duff, water, and soil) these areas when the flare-up
started the conflagration outside the Saturday burn.
B. MONDAY AND THEREAFTER
Mop-up operations commence when the fire is pronounced "contained"--usually at
a point when new ignitions appear unlikely and perimeter control lines are well-established.
Mop-up operations were coordinated through the relocated Incident Command Post at
Alameda Naval Air Station. The ICS was kept intact. Operations were divided among
three Branches, eight Divisions, with 12 Strike Teams assigned to each 12-hour work period.
Operations were well-organized and coordinated. Division chiefs were briefed, radio
frequency assignments made, safety hazards identified, and weather conditions discussed.
Objectives for each work period were explained and, insofar as could be determined, met.
ead de
Mop-up was an orderly site-by-site operation to locate and extinguish remaining hot
spots. Considerable digging through and movement of debris was involved. Anything
salvageable found was carefully set aside and called to the attention of patrol officers. In
a few circumstances, salvageable items were given to, or left in the custody of an identified
owner or Occupant.
From 8:00 a.m., October 21, through demobilization of mutual aid resources on
October 24, Strike Team leaders and company officers expressed approval of the mop-up
operations management. Reports simply stated "operations went smoothly and without
incidents."
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
a Mop-up techniques and standard practices should be incorporated in the
training of all companies in areas with wildland intermix fire zones.
5
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IX. DEMOBILIZATION
Demobilization actually commenced while fire fighting was still very heavy. A few
in-county resources were released between 9:00 p.m., October 20th and 8:00 a.m., the 21st
as more mutual aid became available. This normal action is taken to restore depleted
resources in nearby communities. Those first released were committed early in the fire fight
and had been working hard.
A formalized Demobilization Center was established as an extension of the base
camp operation at N.A.S. Alameda. All out-of-county resources were processed through the
center. The demobilization process includes:
(1) Ascertaining that personnel are properly rested for the trip home,
(2) | Determining need for any medical attention,
(3) Inventorying to discover damaged or lost equipment,
(4) Inspecting of vehicles to determine whether or not they are roadworthy. Making
needed repairs when necessary and practicable,
(S) Inspecting safety and emergency warning devices to insure proper operation,
(6) | Checking fuels and lubricants, replenishing as needed, and
(7) Offering stress counseling, if available.
On a large-scale operation such as the East Bay hills fire, demobilization is both
necessary and time-consuming. It is an invariably frustrating process to firefighters who are
ready to go home. There are also inevitable differences of opinion between vehicle
inspectors/mechanics and unit officers as to the operational safety/reliability of a particular
unit.
During the Demobilization Center’s period of operation, it inspected, serviced and
fueled 424 vehicles. Release dates:
October 20: 2 Engine Strike Teams
October 21: 1 Engine Strike Team
October 22: 12 Engine Strike Teams
October 23: 34 Engine Strike Teams, 1 Water Tanker
October 24: 22 Engine Strike Teams
October 27: 1 Support Unit
October 28: 1 Support Unit
October 29: 2 Engine Strike Teams
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The most common comment from Strike Team officers was, "considering the
magnitude of the task, demobilization went fairly quick and appeared to be well-organized.
Some of the complaints expressed were "held too long in demob," "not on a more distance-
first basis," "release time takes too long," “damaged hose not replaced,” "releases not based
upon provider’s need," and "demobilization not well-organized, difficult to get a mechanic."
The safety check discovered problems in 151 units; 146 mechanical problems were
corrected, and 72 non-safety related problems were deferred. One hundred five (46%) units
were surveyed for damage before release. Fourteen units were not able to travel home with
their strike team because of mechanical problems which couldn’t be resolved by release
time. Thirty-five units necessitated repair arrangements by the provider.
Of those surveyed, 174 officers felt demobilization was smooth and orderly, and 20
felt it was not well-organized. Twenty-one had no opinion.
eA].
X. EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION
The problems in disseminating emergency public information during the East Bay
hills fire were not new, nor were they unique to the incident. The following is based on
interviews with public information officers and the media involved in the fire. They had
much to suggest about information coordination and local agency response.
According to both the media and Oakland Public Information Officers, the City of
Oakland has an excellent plan for the dissemination of information in a crisis. However,
in the East Bay hills fire, there were very few people who were trained in, or knew and
understood the plan. The plan was not followed during the course of the fire. Almost all
the activities were reactive.
A. AS IT HAPPENED
Because the fire started on a Sunday, a day in which there were no Public
Information Officers on duty, an Oakland fire captain (whose normal job is Communications
Officer) was appointed Public Information Officer by the Incident Commander. He was
designated early (about a half an hour into the operation), but he was the only person
involved for quite some time. He had no crisis communications training. City of Oakland
Public Information Officers reported to the Oakland EOC from their homes, and this took
considerable time.
The public information effort is often indicative of the efficient flow of information
within an operation. Since communication and coordination were major problems in the
operation, public information suffered also. It was very difficult for Public Information
Officers to obtain and verify information. Calls from the media into Oakland Dispatch
flooded telephone lines. A Fire Captain said the calls affected Oakland’s ability to deal with
the emergency. It was difficult to release available information through normal channels
because phone lines were jammed.
An Information Center was set up at Fire Station #19, a couple of blocks from the
main Command Post, about 6:00 a.m. the second day. This decision was made because the
Public Information Officers were concerned that the Command Post might have to be
moved and the Information Center would have to be moved also. It was also selected
because it had telephones, bathrooms and other amenities. Cellular-1 brought in 20 cellular
phones. Public Information Officers then called the major media outlets and provided them
with the numbers. One captain said he didn’t feel there were enough Public Information
Officers at the Information Center and that contradictory information was released.
However, reporters complained that there was no information available at the Information
Center:
The first news conference was first held between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. The Public
Information Officer said he got most of his information from listening to Fire Department
frequencies. He also faxed Incident Command System information forms to the media, but
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some information was incorrect. In his words, "Everything that could go wrong, went
wrong."
A California Department of Forestry firefighter trained as a Public Information
Officer was sent to the fire about 2:00 p.m. the first day. He was first put in Operations,
but about midnight he was asked to help the Oakland Fire Department Public Information
Officer. The California Department of Forestry’s first course of action was to ask for more
Public Information Officers.
Oakland Public Information Officers who reported to the Emergency Operations
Center were greeted by pandemonium. They also found the flow of communications
frustrating. Furthermore, the city had a new mayor and staff, none of whom were familiar
with the Oakland plan or had training. Briefings for reporters were held on the sidewalk
in front of the EOC. Oakland’s plan does not address mutual aid for Public Information
Officers. Mutual aid coordination from San Mateo County was offered, but no response was
received from Oakland.
Elected officials were briefed by staff able to get information quickly, but when
information was presented by the Mayor at a news conference it was the first many Public
Information Officers had heard of it. All Public Information Officers should be in the
communication and information loop. City Public Information Officers tried to schedule
regular briefings, using the Coroner’s Office as the sole source of information on number
of fatalities.
B. MEDIA ACCESS
Unlike the Cypress freeway collapse in the Loma Prieta earthquake, the fire was not
contained to a relatively small area. There were many information sources for reporters.
Various cities were releasing information and denying access to the media. Oakland Public
Information Officers said the media were generally ignorant of the type and level of fire.
Members of Bay Area media organizations complained of many roadblocks in their effort
to broadcast life-saving information. One radio news director said he felt there was no
organized effort to get information to the media. He also felt the City’s Emergency Public
Information plan was not followed. He also said his reporters were not allowed access to
the Command Post, Highway 24, and other areas, as allowed under 409.5 (d) of the
California Penal Code. The news director also said he heard dispatch tapes of the Police
Department saying reporters will not be allowed access; he also heard callers to 9-1-1 asking
for information and being told to listen to radio and television.
The radio news director said he felt the Public Information Officers were kept out
of the loop of information and that emergency public information was not high enough
priority. He didn’t think the Emergency Broadcast System should have been activated, but
that the newer, Emergency Digital Information System should have been. He would have
liked to have had updates every 15 minutes.
A television news director said his station had information gathering problems right
away. He said the public had a need to know, not a right to know. He felt better
information flow could have saved lives and that section 409.5 (d) of the California Penal
240%
a
Code needs to be explained to the troops in the field. (It allows media access to disaster
scenes.)
Beyond the requirements of the media, these comments accentuate the need for
rapid, accurate sharing of incident information among and between all parties involved or
impacted.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
= Part of the initial dispatch of resources to any major incident should
automatically be a trained Public Information Officer team. The quicker a Public
Information Officer team can get to a scene and set up operations, the better the
information effort will be.
s A 25-30 person trained Public Information Officer team should be in the plan
for every city and county. Team members will typically work in the field, at the EOC, the
Command Post, phone banks, and in dispatch, answering media and public inquiries.
w An equipped mobile and EOC Information Center is critical as a base of
operations for the team. Adequate staff, cellular phones, fax machines and ham radio
operators are important.
5 Media should have access to information. Whether that access is by phone,
fax, or by entrance into the disaster area (under 409.5(d) PC), reporters must be able to
obtain information.
o Most importantly, emergency public information must be given a high priority
by all involved. A coordinated effort, by a trained team able to obtain information from all
involved, is the key.
= An attorney representing the media reported that both Oakland and Berkeley
have written "letters of understanding" to the media that state law enforcement personnel
from those cities will respect the spirit of 409.5 (d) of the Penal Code. Enhanced training
is required statewide.
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XI. LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS
This report is partially derived from recorded logs, reports, transcriptions, and other
printed information from the City of Oakland Police Department, the City of Berkeley
Police Department, the Alameda County Sheriffs Department, and the Governor’s Office
of Emergency Services, Law Enforcement Division. Ranking officers on duty during the
period of the firestorm were also interviewed.
A. IMMEDIATE RESPONSE
1. Departments Involved
The City of Oakland Police Department is comprised of 652 sworn officers and 359
non-sworn civilians. The department serves a highly urbanized area. The Patrol Division
forms three watch platoons which provide law enforcement services for five designated
districts.
The City of Berkeley Police Department is one of only four California law
enforcement agencies accredited by the nationally recognized Commission on Accreditation
for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. The department’s 132 sworn officers and 12 non-sworn
employees provide the citizens of Berkeley with programs focused on its unique suburban,
residential, university environment. Those services include patrol requiring four shifts daily
to service the city’s 11.4 square miles and 102,724 residents.
2. Fire Event
The fire was noted by an Oakland patrol unit investigating a traffic accident and
fatality in the Marlborough Terrace area of the Oakland Hills at approximately 10:58 a.m.
Sunday morning. Fire units from the Oakland Fire Department had been working early
Sunday morning to drown hot spots and embers within the burned areas of Saturday’s brush
fire. Darkened skies over the East Bay Hills area had been observed by a Berkeley Patrol
Division Lieutenant on his arrival at the Berkeley Hall of Justice at approximately 11:00
a.m. This Lieutenant passed on these observations to the Berkeley Communications Center.
The Lieutenant was told that the rekindled fire was confined to the city of Oakland. At
about the same time, the Oakland Patrol Unit in the Marlborough Terrace area heard radio
reports that the Oakland Fire Department was dispatching additional units to the vicinity
of Saturday evening’s brush fire along Grizzly Peak and Tunnel Road.
3. Initial Law Enforcement Activities
By noon, the police departments and fire services of both cities were still actively
trying to assess the scope of the fire. The City Manager of Berkeley confirms the early
call-out for the Chief of Police, City Manager, and other off-duty department personnel.
By 12:11 p.m., all available on-duty patrol units were staging and being deployed to control
heavy vehicle and pedestrian traffic which had rapidly grown in the area of the Claremont
te
Hotel. The Fire Department ordered the evacuation of homes in the affected area of
Berkeley at 12:17 p.m., ten minutes following the first telephone call for 911 assistance. By
12:38 p.m. all of Berkeley’s law enforcement and fire-fighting personnel were fully
committed to combating the fire and carrying out evacuation orders.
In the city of Oakland, police patrol units were being dispatched to District II, the
area of the fire’s origin, to control traffic and crowds. Several patrol units with officers
unfamiliar with the street layout became lost. One such unit, descending the area through
dense smoke, stopped to pick up two elderly females with their pets. The unit then inched
its way to safety assisted by radio communications with Oakland Dispatch and other nearby
mobile police units. An Oakland Police Officer perished during the first hour of
evacuations.
Getting an overview of the devastating fire was a real problem for the Oakland
Police Department. Deputy Chief Tom Donahue, in charge of Oakland Police Department
Operations, stated that had he had a total picture of the fire from the air, it would have
greatly assisted law enforcement’s initial response to affected areas.
The Oakland Police Department evacuated over 5,000 people during the first hours
of the fire. Officers made door-to-door evacuation orders. Motor units were especially
useful in maneuvering through the logjam of abandoned vehicles and fleeing pedestrians.
The added missions of traffic and access control, perimeter security depleted the
department’s personnel resources by late afternoon. The Alameda County Sheriffs
Department, having mutual aid coordination responsibilities, responded to Chief Hart’s
request for assistance immediately upon request.
B. LAW ENFORCEMENT MUTUAL AID
The Law Enforcement Operational Area Coordinator, Sheriff Plummer, provided
initial mutual aid responders from his own department along with officer elements from
several Alameda County police departments. Access control and anti-looting patrol
activities became primary tasks for mutual aid responders. The influx of these fresh
resources allowed Oakland Police Department to relieve its personnel, some of whom had
been on line since the beginning of the morning shift. The City of Berkeley Police
Department was also augmented by mutual aid forces.
The common missions of access control, anti-looting, perimeter security and further
evacuations transcended jurisdictional lines. Units of responding mutual aid officers could
be observed in both Oakland and Berkeley supplanting the beleaguered police forces of
both cities.
Staging and briefings of mutual aid responders were accomplished at the Convention
Center. This facility was distant from the firestorm scene and afforded some advantages for
arriving responder units and the Oakland Police Department:
mw No added traffic within the fire area;
m No interference with on-going fire fighting and evacuations;
mw Provided necessary shelter for off-duty elements.
+ Cp le
Alameda Co Sheriffs’s Department 280 State OES, Region II
nee Contra Costa County
Police Departments - Alameda County Marin County
Alameda Ce San Francisco Police
Emeryville & ee San Mateo County
Fremont oe Santa Clara County
Hayward ee Solano County
Livermore oe Sonoma County
Newark oe | | SUB-TOTAL
Pleasanton | oo
San Leandro = Alameda Co Sheriffs Dept
Union City : : Alameda Co Cities
B.A.R.T. _6 Out-of-County Departments
SUB-TOTAL TOTAL
1. Command and Control
Maintaining direction and control of law enforcement and other response resources
was an initial problem. This was largely due to a lack of information and the flow of
information in the first hours of the fire. This was especially true in the City of Oakland.
Radio frequencies used by fire services and police elements were taxed to maximum
capacity. As is the case in most emergencies, those radio frequencies specifically set aside
for emergency/disaster use are generally used daily for non-emergency purposes; their
primary function as an emergency response frequency is negated when most needed.
A common Emergency Operation Center (EOC) was not established early during the
firestorm. In Oakland, the fire services Field Command Post was mobile and changed
location several times. The Oakland Police Department retained its operations from
headquarters until eventually moving its field base of operations to the Rockridge B.A.R.T.
Station. It was later moved again to a local school building. The City of Oakland EOC,
which opened at Fire Station #1, was yet a third point of coordination. Direction and
control becomes complicated, at best, with such wide-flung locations attempting resources
coordination and decision-making.
In Berkeley the EOC was fully activated by mid-afternoon, though some of the EOC
staff, including the City Manager and the Chief of Police, had been there earlier as the fire
was evolving.
Communication was a continual problem and presented an obstacle throughout the
event. Personal liaison among agencies provided some assistance in information flow and
exchange.
2. Coroner Operations
The Alameda County Sheriff's Department mission includes coroner responsibilities.
The Sheriff's Coroner’s Bureau was solely responsible for the task of recovering the remains
ise
of victims of the Oakland hills fire in the Cities of Berkeley and Oakland. The coroner is
responsible for the dignified recovery of the dead; securing personal belongings; and
determining the cause, mode, and manner of death.
The Sheriffs Coroner’s Bureau was alerted to the fire by Alameda County Dispatch
at 1400 hours on Sunday afternoon, October 20, 1991. On-duty staff at the bureau were
ordered to remain on duty and call-out was begun for off-duty personnel to form 12 hour
shifts. Call-out and response occurred without problems; facilities equipment and supplies
on hand were considered adequate at the time of notification. The morgue’s refrigeration
unit capacity was at 66%. The usual capacity of 45 spaces could be doubled, if need be,
with slight alteration to the available floor space.
The bureau’s emergency event staff needs were met by on-duty bureau personnel, all
of whom participated in emergency operations during the Loma Prieta earthquake two years
earlier. Commander Cain and staff supervisors implemented standing bureau plans which
included:
a Contact with contract pathologists, odontologists, and anthropologists,
notifying them of the possibilities for their services.
a Requesting additional deputies for the exterior security of the 4th Street
coroner’s facility.
a Added photographers for on-site recoveries; courier function for dental
records or odontology reports deliveries from dentists offices and hospitals.
a Continuity of normal Public Administrator duties during the emergency event.
Field operations were conducted exceptionally well. There was no shortage of
supplies or equipment, and all recovery equipment functioned properly. No delays were due
to lack of staff or needed equipment. Replacement consumable supplies were ordered as
on-hand items were used. Due to the nature of the recoveries, a special requirement
developed for sieve equipment for use in the fire’s rubble. The department’s carpenter
shop constructed several archaeological field sieves on short notice. These improvised items
proved invaluable in uncovering identifiable remains. From October 20 through 28 the
Coroner’s Bureau completed 71 deceased recoveries:
i 25 fire victims
a 12 non-human remains recovered from the incident
z 34 non-fire deceased recoveries
Crisis counselors were at the bureau throughout the emergency period. The focus
of their attention was toward victim families. They were extremely busy on some days; the
service they provided freed coroner personnel from these duties. In addition to assisting in
mitigating families’ immediate grief, they also established themselves as a source for
follow-up counseling for many victims’ families.
_ Mobile radio for coroner’s operations is confined to the local government frequency.
During normal operations, day-to-day use of this frequency is heavy. During the emergency,
aSAe
the frequency was described as congested. Static feedback also added to mobile radio
communication difficulty. Cellular phones offered the best alternative to mobile radio
outside of a dedicated coroner’s frequency. The phones worked very well except battery
power placed a limit on availability. The inadequate number of cellular phones also limited
their effective use.
Power was interrupted for a short while on October 20; this posed no significant
threat to operations. Lacking adequate data base and spread sheet software programs made
access to on-hand information take longer than was necessary.
Sequencing of forensic services became a concern for pathologists. In a few
instances, odontologists and anthropologists examined remains before pathology services
were concluded. While this did not present major problems or delays in the identification
process, it did raise questions of procedure.
3. Victim Recovery
The bodies of the first known victims were recovered and identities determined the
first evening of the fire. With the memory of the Loma Prieta earthquake and the Cypress
Street freeway structure collapse still fresh, the Alameda County Sheriff and Coroner
requested mutual aid assistance ‘» the thorough search of the burned area.
Search and rescue units, iargely a volunteer force, were alerted to the task as early
as Sunday night. Full planning for recovery was undertaken by a combined group of sheriff's
deputies and department volunteers. Inter-regional resources were identified and requested
for search operations to begin on Tuesday, October 22, 1991. Units and departments
included are set forth in the following table.
x55\6
LIST OF PARTICIPANTS IN SEARCH OPERATIONS
AGENCY STAFF HOURS
ALAMEDA COUNTY —_79 (volunteers) 893.75
oe e _45 (paid) 438,25
SUB-TOTAL | 1,331.00
BAMRU | ee ae : S125
Cal ESAR Cs 43 437.00
CARDA oe 70 /33 dogs 697.25
Contra Costa : 30 285.25
EBRPD 350.00
E] Dorado County 134.75
Marin County 93.00
Placer County 296.25
San Mateo County 700.75
Santa Clara County 1,007:25
Santa Cruz County 3510
Sonoma County 406.25
WOOF 14 /14 dogs 131.50
Fire Services 71 588.25
State OES 15 111.00
MISC 2135.75
TOTALS 7,374.00
As outlined in the plan, the charred residences of persons listed as missing would be
searched first. An extensive base of operation was established on lands of East Bay
Regional Parks. This Command Post, established at Lake Temescal, provided a command
center, staging area, and all the needed functions of a base camp. These facilities would be
used through Saturday, October 26, 1991.
Aided with search dogs trained in disaster recoveries, ground searchers labored on
hands and knees for four consecutive days, sifting through ash, soot and debris. By October
26, the remains of the last victim of the firestorm were recovered. The Sheriffs Coroner
function was completed Monday, October 28.
56 -
a
Xlil. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
The fire unfolded so rapidly that it was difficult for the emergency management
system, despite plans, training and professional personnel, to keep up. The command,
control and coordination mechanisms at the intra and inter-governmental levels were not
fully functional until well into the emergency.
A. NOTIFICATIONS
Inter-agency notification appears to have been problematic. Due to the speed of the
fire’s spread, interagency notifications were often slow. Some agencies first became aware
of the fire’s destruction through media accounts, rather than through official notification
channels. This led to staff and agencies attempting telephone contact with emergency
dispatch centers which were already overloaded with emergency calls. More effective
notification systems, capable of rapid reaction, should be developed.
In an attempt to gather timely, accurate information, the State Office of Emergency
Services (OES) sent liaison representatives to local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs).
These individuals functioned as "eyes and ears" to better understand the nature of the
emergency, and the types of assistance required to deal with the emergency. Some
Tepresentatives were also dispatched to field command posts, again due to lack of
information flow among sites and agencies.
B. EMERGENCY BROADCAST SYSTEM
Oakland chose not to use the Emergency Broadcast System due to its perceived
inefficiency. The capability existed for Oakland to put out a single announcement or
evacuation order. Individual stations may decline to broadcast local EBS messages;
however, federal regulation stipulates that every broadcast station must be equipped and
ready to receive an EBS message.
Completely overhauled in 1990, the EBS system was specifically authorized for this
particular type of use. Oakland was authorized to activate local EBS directly without having
to go through either the county or the state.
C. SHELTERING NOTIFICATION
Within 24 hours of the event, approximately 5,000 persons were evacuated and in
need of shelter. Eleven shelters were set up by the American Red Cross. Some residents
were allowed to return to inspect damage after evacuating the area. Having dealt with
similar problems in the past, Oakland and the Red Cross worked around the clock to place
evacuees into shelters. The process was slow because setting up evacuation centers takes
time and it was difficult to remove persons from the fire area.
S79
D. RECOVERY
Because of Oakland’s experience during Loma Prieta, the city established separate
groups to deal with recovery issues. Six policy groups were established to streamline
operations; clean-up, erosion, economics, public safety, rebuilding, and communications.
These groups met daily and involved six or more representatives of the 18 departments that
were involved in these policy groups.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
To a great extent, the early functions of emergency management were handled by law
enforcement and fire services. Overall emergency coordination is, however, a shared
responsibility, among and between departments and disciplines. Key aspects requiring
improvement are the development and sharing of information, including provision of timely
and appropriate emergency information to the public, and the facilitation of coordinated,
multi-disciplinary response to large-scale emergencies.
cs Another issue is the need for the fire service and law enforcement decision
and coordination centers to better communicate and coordinate with the overall emergency
management function. Comments and observations indicate that the systems, though inter-
related, often failed to coordinate information, activities and planning with other agencies
in different disciplines.
= Local emergency management staff from each community were overwhelmed.
Oakland responded by accepting emergency managers from Santa Clara and Contra Costa
as mutual aid staffing. This concept has been employed on a limited basis in other
emergencies, and should be expanded statewide. A more formal process for tasking and
assignments is needed.
iy The Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS) and Emergency Digital
Information System (EDIS) need to be marketed so that they are used to their fullest
benefit.
258 .
ANNEX A
CALIFORNIA’S LARGEST
RESIDENTIAL WILDLAND FIRE LOSSES
(Losses in Excess of 50 Structures)
ACRES STRUCTURES
YEAR NAMES OF FIRE COUNTY BURNED DESTROYED
1923 City of Berkeley Alameda 130 584
1961 Harlow Mariposa 41,200 106
1961 Bel-Air Los Angeles 6,090 484
1964 Hanley Series Napa-Sonoma 71,601 174
1964 Coyote Santa Barbara 61,000 94
1967 Paseo Grande Riverside 48,639 61
1970 “California Series Statewide 576,508 722
1970 Bear San Bernardino 53,100 54
1977 Sycamore Santa Barbara 804 234
1978 Creighton Ridge Sonoma 11,405 64
1980 Stable San Bernardino 5,482 65
1980 Summit Series San Bernardino 41,472 355
1981 Atlas Peak Napa 22,000 69
1982 Dayton Haul Ventura/L.A. 57,000 65
1985 Lehr San Diego 200 64
1988 49’er Nevada 33,500 Siz
1988 Fern Shasta 7,800 58
1990 Painted Cave Santa Barbara 4,900 641
1990 "A" Rock Mariposa 12,136 66
SUB-TOTAL 4,272
1991 Oakland Hills Alameda 1,600 3,354
TOTAL: 7,172
"A series of 773 separate fires located throughout the length of California occurred over an
approximate 10 day period.
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OAKLAND/BERKELEY HILLS
FIRE OF ANE
ESTIMATED
OCA Wier UOT. FIRE SPREAD
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PIEDMONT “3 CRAIG CASTANEDA
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OPERATIONS PLANNING LOGISTICS FINANCE
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STAGING
AREAS RESOURCES SERVICE TIME
UNIT BRANCH UNIT
BRANCHES AIR
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Hazard Mitigation Report - East Bay Fire," Office of Emergency Services,
Nov 26, 1991.
Berkeley, California Conflagration, National Board of Fire Underwriters,
Sept by. 1923:
Wildland Fire Operations and Mutual Aid Procedures, Berkeley Fire Department,
Feb, 1991
Berkeley Fire Department, Radio Logs and CFIRS, Oct 20, 1991.
"California, The Endangered Dream," Special Issue. TIME, Nov 18, 1991.
"Report - Urban Interface," 1982 Blue Rrbbon Fire Prevention Committee. East
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OES State Fire and Rescue Emergency Mutual Aid Plan, Revised Sept 1988.
OES Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid System, Revised April 198%.
"Neighbors Bordering on Anger," Oakierd Tribune, Nov 20, 1991.
Oakland Fire Department Radio Logs, Oct 20, 1991.
OES Situation Summary, 1300, Oct 21, 1991.
"Wildland Fires and Flooding in California," Recommendations of Governor’s Task
Force on Chaparral Fire and Flood Risk Management, California Department
of Forestry, April 198f!.
"The Fire Siege of 1987: Lightning Fires Devastate the Forests of California,"
California Department of Forestry, Sept 1988.
"Conflagrations in California, Committee Recommendations," California Disaster
Office, May 1966.
"Fire Prevention Programs of Counties and Cities with a Wildland Fire Potential",
Report to Legislature, California Department of Forestry, Feb 1980.
"An Evaluation of Efforts to Provide Fire Safety to Development and Occupancy
Within Wildlands of California," California Department of Forestry,
April 1973.
605
We
18.
19:
ZV:
PEN
22.
2a:
24.
"Recommendations to Solve California’s Wildland Fire Problem," Task Force on
California Wildland Fire Problem, June 1972.
"Loma Prieta Earthquake," Fire and Rescue Operations, April 8, 1991.
"Fires in Southern California," Hazard Mitigation Survey Team Report,
June 26 - 30, 1985.
"California’s Conflagrations, June 27 - July 20, 1985," California Department of
Forestry, May 1986.
"California Aflame, September 22 - October 4, 1970," California Department of
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"Law Enforcement Operations, Loma Prieta," OES Law Division, May 1990.
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“65a
BERKELEY LIBRARIES
C12490
